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I. INTRODUCTION
In a series of books and articles, Professor Marshall Shapo has
developed the idea of American tort law as a "cultural mirror"L-a
legal system reflecting cultural norms that serves as the "intellectual
and practical foundation for society's response to injuries."2  The
"cultural mirror" metaphor captures both the notion that there is a
substantive normative basis for tort law that exists within society and
the procedural notion that tort law ensures that those underlying
norms are reflected in the resolution of tort disputes. 3
Although I believe Professor Shapo's description to be funda-
mentally correct, it is also incomplete, and, as a result, somewhat
misleading. It is correct in the sense that the moral intuitions of
society form the underlying basis of tort law.4 It is misleading, how-
ever, in that it views twentieth-century American society as a single
entity possessing a unitary or common "culture" that can be reflected
in the law. In fact, our culture is enormously diverse in terms of
conventional indicators such as race, religion, and ethnicity. More
importantly, our society consists of many different groups-both
within and cutting across various subcultures-that can be identified
based on function. These functionally classified groups-professionals
such as doctors, engineers, or product sellers (including insurers), for
1. See Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us
About the American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1567 (1995); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of
the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 647 (1995);
Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability and the Search for Justice 198-99 (Carolina Academic
Press, 1993).
2. Shapo, Products Liability at 19 (cited in note 1).
3. Shapo, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1588-89 (cited in note 1).
4. Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A Descriptive Model of the
Development of Tort Doctrine, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1231 (1990).
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example-can be identified by commonality in knowledge, experience,
expectation, and perception. In addition, they can sometimes be dis-
tinguished from non-group members by disparities in these same
factors.5 In short, individuals view the world differently depending on
their knowledge, training, experience, and professional socialization,
and on the peculiar slants imparted by membership in communities
or in racial and ethnic groups. 6
In this Article I maintain that explicit recognition of these
differences in perception and expectation is the key to the proper
resolution of tort cases. Specifically, I advance a number of claims.
First, tort law must be understood essentially as a system in which
individuals assess other individuals' conduct. As a result, most tradi-
tional tort cases turn on the answer to questions such as the follow-
ing: Did the defendant impose an unacceptably high risk on others? 7
Was the defendant motivated by something that is considered im-
proper?8 Did the defendant intend to do harm or take unfair advan-
tage?9 Although we have, from time to time, lost sight of this essen-
tial characteristic of the system (most notably in early attempts to
impose strict liability on the sellers of products), judging conduct
5. For the sake of convenience, in this Article "non-group" members such as product con-
sumers, medical patients, and insureds will often be identified as though they are distinct
groups. This is done simply to avoid the more precise, but awkward, identifications of "non-
manufacturer, non-doctor, or non-insurer." Under the analysis presented here, however, the
relevant factor is that non-members do not share the other groups' perspectives because they
lack the knowledge, training, experience, and professional socialization that group membership
typically entails.
6. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture, and Personality: Their Structure and
Dynamics (Harper & Brothers, 1947). Sorokin explains:
Each occupation tends thus to remake its members in its own image. And the longer an
individual stays in the same occupation the deeper is the transformation.
A long-time professor of physics looks at the world in a way fundamentally
different from that of a long-time priest; both view it differently from a long-time factory
worker, a druggist, a farmer, a sailor, a banker, a king, a prostitute.
Id. at 211. See also Joseph Bensman and Robert Lilienfeld, Craft and Consciousness:
Occupational Technique and the Development of World Images (Walter de Gruyter, 2d ed. 1991).
7. For a discussion of tort law in terms of level and type of risk to which one exposes
another, see George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537
(1972).
8. I have discussed the role of motivation in Martin A. Kotler, Motivation and Tort Law:
Acting for Economic Gain as a Suspect Motive, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 63 (1988), and Kotler, 58 U.
Cin. L. Rev. at 2860-67 (cited in note 4).
9. Kotler, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1254-60 (cited in note 4).
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remains at the heart of tort law--even in many "strict liability'
cases.10
Second, an individual's perception and assessment of conduct,
whether it be his or her own or that of others, is deeply influenced by
membership in "groups" as that term is explained above. While there
are undoubtedly certain types of behavior that would be universally
praised or condemned, attempts to understand the tort system with-
out recognizing the existence of widespread, honest disagreements as
to how an act should be judged will inevitably be unsuccessful.
Third, as a purely descriptive matter, our existing tort system
contains numerous examples of legal doctrine that recognize, or at
least permit recognition of, what I will call the "group selection prob-
lem." This phrase describes the need for the judiciary to recognize
explicitly that a different result may be achieved in a given case de-
pending on which group's perspective is used to view harmful conduct.
Unfortunately, because the problem is rarely articulated, judges often
miss the issue entirely or make group selection decisions based purely
on intuition. The result is that cases are frequently decided incor-
rectly, or correct outcomes are reached for the wrong reasons. This
Article argues that the judiciary must explicitly address the problem
and make group selection decisions in a principled manner.
I posit that our commitment to majoritarian politics provides
the principled basis upon which judges can and should resolve the
group selection problem. Armed with this insight, I will offer a recon-
ceptualization of the idea of strict liability in tort. While I recognize
the familiar notion that strict liability is a body of doctrine developed
to accomplish instrumentalist resource allocation goals, I make the
case that there is a second type of strict liability that can and should
be understood in terms of judging one person's conduct by another's
standard.
Finally, I seek to illustrate how the model of tort law developed
in this Article can be used both to analyze some of the more difficult
issues of modern products liability law and to criticize other visions of
the tort system. Specifically, I will explain why I believe the drafters
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts took the wrong path in drafting
section 402A11 and why I believe that the drafters of the Resthtement
10. I shall later argue that there are two distinct forms of "strict liability." One of them,
properly understood, is actually a form of assessment of conduct. See notes 127-43 and accom-
panying text.
11. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
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(Third) of Torts: Products Liability12 are repeating the error in the
course of trying to correct it.
II. TORT LAW AS THE ASSESSMENT OF CONDUCT
The goals of tort law have been the subject of intense debate
since the nineteenth century. 13 On the one hand, some view tort
doctrine as a vehicle for judging the adequacy of human conduct in
particular cases based on some more or less idealized after-the-fact
vision of how one ought to have behaved.14 Regardless of whether tort
law measures conduct based on an external objective standard such
as the "ordinary reasonable prudent person" standard or based on a
subjective "best efforts" standard, adherents to this model view the
imposition of tort liability as the consequence of a behavioral
shortcoming-that is, the failure to perform adequately some act or
make some decision. Under this view, tort law, like criminal law, is
retributory in nature, seeking both to punish past actions and to deter
future bad conduct.'s In essence, a tort judgment for the plaintiff
declares that the defendant ought not to have done something or
ought to have done something better. 16
On the other hand, other participants in the debate subscribe
to a competing conception of tort. This view led to the development of
tort doctrine that imposes liability based either on a particular rela-
tionship between the parties or on an assessment of "things" inde-
pendently from the conduct that created them. 7  This doctrine im-
12. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ch. 1 (Proposed Final Draft,
Preliminary Version, Oct. 18, 1996).
13. See, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Little, Brown, 1946).
See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (Simon & Schuster, 2d ed.
1985); Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359
(1951); Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation,
15 Ga. L. Rev. 925 (1981); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 Yale L. J. 1717 (1981); G. Edward White, Tort Law in America:
An Intellectual History (Oxford U., 1980).
14. Holmes, The Common Law at 108-09 (cited in note 13).
15. This argument is set forth in some detail in Kotler, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1233-35 (cited
in note 4).
16. See Shapo, Products Liability at 8 (cited in note 1).
17. According to Dean Prosser, vicarious liability dates back to primitive law. See W.
Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, and David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts (West, 5th ed. 1984).
The idea of vicarious liability was common enough in primitive law. Not only the torts
of servants and slaves, or even wives, but those of inanimate objects, were charged
against their owner. The movement of the earlier English law was away from such
19971 559
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poses liability vicariously on parties for the harmful conduct of others,
or because of their relationship to injury-causing products or involve-
ment in high-risk activities, to name the most obvious.
Regardless of what may have been the basis for the early strict
liability cases, today the adoption of an approach that imposes liabil-
ity regardless of conduct normally represents an instrumentalist view
of tort. Liability is imposed to further some policy unrelated to the
parties' behavior. As such, strict liability may be viewed as a cost
allocation system intended to achieve various goals, 18 such as wealth
redistribution, efficiency, autonomy, and so on.
Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility of linking the im-
position of liability to something other than behavior, however, it is
overwhelmingly clear that there historically has been enormous hos-
tility to the imposition of liability absent human fault.19 Although a
detailed analysis of this phenomenon is well beyond the scope of this
Article, one need only look at the abnormally dangerous activity cases
to see the pattern. While the First Restatement of Torts may have
contemplated the imposition of liability based on the inherently dan-
gerous nature of certain activities, by the time the American Law
Institute ("ALr') adopted the Second Restatement, the focus had
shifted to conduct-to the social acceptability of engaging in the
strict responsibility, until by the sixteenth century it was considered that the master
should not be liable for his servants torts unless he had commanded the particular act.
But soon after 1700 this rule was found to be far too narrow.., and the courts began to
revert to something like the earlier rule ....
Id. at 500 (footnote omitted). See also Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 Duke
L. J. 1, 9 (1995) ("[The] concept of product dynamism pervades the legal traditions that have
shaped American law.").
18. Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 500-01
(cited in note 17).
19. See William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tex. L.
Rev. 777, 815 (1983) ("Faults tenacity in products cases is not merely a reflection of courts'
attraction to familiar concepts or their political unwillingness to abandon fault. Fault is deeply
embedded in the doctrinal structure of strict products liability itself... :'). Common law and
statutory vicarious liability stand out as notable exceptions to this hostility toward strict
liability. Additionally, statutory compensation schemes such as worker's compensation are now
generally accepted, although they initially encountered resistance. See, for example, Ives v.
South Buffalo Railway Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911) (holding New York's 1910 worker's
compensation statute to be an unconstitutional taking without due process).
In my opinion, Professor Coleman offers the most interesting explanation for the adoption of
instrumentalist strict liability in some cases, but its rejection in others. He argues that the
central issue is whether or not the imposition of liability is seen as an unfair stigmatization. If
instrumentalist strict liability is openly imposed, it is accepted. If, however, strict liability is
accomplished through an irrebutable presumption of negligence, "an unwarranted imputation of
fault reflects unfavorably and unfairly on the character of the accused." Jules L. Coleman, The
Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 259, 280-82 (1976).
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activity in the particular place and time and in light of the activity's
utility.2 0
More importantly for our purposes, the trend has been the
same in products cases. Although "strict product liability" cases often
contain language asserting the irrelevance of the manufacturer's or
designer's conduct,21 courts and commentators have increasingly ac-
knowledged that the majority of cases do, in fact, turn on conduct.22
As one court stated:
Although many courts have insisted that the risk-utility tests they are apply-
ing are not negligence tests because their focus is on the product rather than
the manufacturer's conduct, the distinction on closer examination appears to
be nothing more than semantic. As a common-sense matter, the jury weighs
competing factors presented in evidence and reaches a conclusion about the
judgment or decision (i.e. conduct) of the manufacturer.23
20. See the comments made by Professor Epstein in Session One, Discussion of Paper by
Richard Epstein, University of Chicago, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2227 (1989):
The Restatement Second rule for abnormally dangerous activities involved a six part
balancing test for determining whether an activity was ultrahazardous. The older
definition was essentially a list: spraying for termites, blasting, airspraying on crops,
and so forth.... The older rule, while arbitrary, made for much more certainty than the
new and unpredictable balancing test makes for.
Id. at 2241-42 (footnote omitted).
21. See, for example, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 889 (Alaska, 1979)
(focusing on the product); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955, 958-59
(1976) (noting the irrelevance of the defendants conduct); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269
Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974).
22. In the course of explaining the decision to retain the use of "strict liability" language to
describe the proposed conduct assessment treatment of design and warning cases, the drafters
of the Third Restatement observe that:
These latter categories of cases require determinations that the product could have
reasonably been made safer by a better design or instruction or warning. Sections 2(b)
and (c) rely on a reasonableness test traditionally used in determining whether an actor
has been negligent.... Nevertheless, many courts insist on speaking of liability based
on the standards described in §§ 2(b) and (c) as being "strict."
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1, cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft). See also
David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68
Notre Dame L. Rev. 427 (1993) (arguing that principles of freedom and equality mandate a fault
standard in design and warning cases).
23. Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (1984)
(citations omitted). See also Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 609-10 (1980)
(quoted by the Prentis court); Powers, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 791-92 (cited in note 19) CWithout the
addition of arbitrary distinctions, defectiveness under the risk-utility approach is merely an
evaluation of a manufacturer's conduct in the guise of an evaluation of the product.").
The fact that behavior is being judged in these cases largely explains how some courts have
disregarded the logical inconsistency that would otherwise exist and have permitted the
imposition of a comparative fault defense in a strict liability products case. See, for example,
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162, 1178 (1978) (Jefferson, J.,
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If Professor Shapo is correct in his assertion that tort law is a
"cultural mirror," then the foregoing is really not surprising at all.
For better or worse we have come to think of tort law in terms of
punishment, and any change in this perception will not happen
quickly.
Next, one must consider the issue of process. The jury decis-
ionmaking process, central to the decision of tort cases, has long been
viewed as the appropriate manner of determining whether an indi-
vidual's conduct has conformed with the community's standards of
behavior.24
Although the eighteenth-century conception of the jury as
finder of the law evolved into our modern conception of the jury as
finder of fact, with the lawmaking function being vested in the judge
or legislature,25 one important exception survived. In cases not
concurring and dissenting) (noting the logical inconsistency). See also notes 155-56 and
accompanying text.
24. This is not to say that everybody agrees that these decisions should be turned over to
juries. See, for example, James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept- Retreat
from the Rule of Law, 51 Ind. L. J. 467 (1976); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531
(1973). Professor Henderson argues that cases are given to the jury as a means of disguising
the "polycentric" nature of the decision which must be made. He defines "polycentric problems"
as
many-centered problems, in which each point for decision is related to all the others as
are the strands of a spider web. If one strand is pulled, a complex pattern of
readjustments will occur throughout the entire web.... A lawyer seeking to base his
argument upon established principle and required to address himself in discourse to
each of a dozen strands, or issues, would find his task frustratingly impossible.
Id. at 1536. Professor Henderson continues:
[T]he courts early declined to adjudicate answers to the polycentric question, "How
much quality control is enough?" They eschewed that task by simply deciding that
defendant manufacturers owed no duty of care to injured consumers with whom they
had not dealt contractually ... [B]y adopting the no-duty approach, the courts
succeeded in protecting themselves from the polycentricity inherent in attempting to
establish specific standards with which to review the reasonableness of manufacturers'
efforts at quality control. In effect, they solved the institutional problems inhering in
the general reasonableness standard by refusing to apply it.
Id. at 1544-45 (footnote omitted).
In the course of discussing Dean Wade's seven part risk/utility balancing test for product
design defect, Professor Epstein commented:
The balancing criteria turn out to be so utterly plastic and fluid that any given result is
consistent with any given outcome. This in turn leads to the relative dominance of the
jury and the relative decline of the law. The older law of products liability was a denser
assemblage of rules and doctrines. A reasonableness-under-the-circumstances test
swallows up all of these details.
10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2241 (cited in note 20).
25. For an historical background of the shifting conception of jury function, see William
Edward Nelson, The Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Changes on
Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Harvard U., 1975); William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-
Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 893
(1978).
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controlled by statute, under the rubric of deciding "mixed questions of
law and fact," juries have largely retained the power not only to
determine whether a party, in fact, performed a certain act, but also
to judge the culpability of the parties' conduct.26
In defining behavioral norms and determining whether a party
has conformed with them, it is important to remember that juries do
not necessarily equate a group's actual practices with norms of behav-
ior-that is, with how group members should behave. People often
condemn behavior that they engage in themselves,27 a fact which has
long been accorded formal recognition within the legal system. Norms
thus represent a somewhat idealized version of appropriate
behavior. 28 The "ordinary, reasonable, prudent person," for example,
is considerably more careful and is possessed of considerably more
foresight than mere mortals.29 Along the same lines, tort law
generally has refused to make compliance with group custom
dispositive on the question of negligence.30 Rather, the existence of
negligence tends to turn on whether or not there is an after-the-fact
26. See generally Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 Ga.
L. Rev. 123, 133 (1985) (discussing the jury's decisionmaking function); Dale W. Broeder, The
Functions of the Jury Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 386, 405 (1954) (discussing "mixed
questions of law and fact"). See also David Millon, Juries, Judges, and Democracy, 18 L. &
Social Inquiry 135 (1993) (reviewing Shannon C. Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law:
Anglo.American Jurisprudence before John Marshall (Princeton U., 1990)). Professor Millon
argues that the historical shift in the role of the jury from law maker to fact finder represented
"the emergence of a strong sense of hostility toward popular involvement in the adjudicatory
process, prompting elite legal professionals to advocate a sharp curtailment of the jury's role."
Id. at 153-54. See also Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law at 8 (cited in note 25)
(arguing that juries were stripped of the lawmaking function during the nineteenth century
because of the business community's need for consistency in decisionmaking).
27. But see Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 291-93 (Little, Brown,
1966) (concluding that in some cases jurors may be reluctant to punish defendants for having
engaged in conduct in which they themselves engage).
28. Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 174-75
(cited in note 17) (describing the "reasonable person" as a fictitious, idealized, and mythical
person).
29. Id. (quoting A. P. Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common Law 12-16 (G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1930)). The idealized nature of the standard is magnified by the fact that conduct is
invariably judged after it has already resulted in harm. Psychologists who have studied this
phenomenon agree that there is a human tendency to overestimate the foreseeability of
consequences after those consequences have occurred. See Baruch Fischhoff and Ruth Beyth, 'I
Knew It Would Happen"- Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance 1 (1975); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight e Foresight. The
Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance 288 (1975).
30. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). See also Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash.
2d 514, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974). But see Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 422
(4th Cir. 1993) (insisting that the plaintiff prove noncompliance with industry standards).
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willingness to endorse the custom in light of all information about the
conduct at issue, including alternative courses of action.31
In any event, one of the great strengths of the tort system is
that the institution of the jury permits assessment of conduct on a
case-by-case basis.3 2  This results in enormous flexibility since the
standard of behavior is not crystallized into a rule having precedential
value and thus does not become binding on later generations, who
remain free to define and redefine norms of behavior as times and
circumstances change. 33
III. THE GROUP SELECTION PROBLEM
A. Recognizing the Problem
Even if one is prepared to acknowledge the existence of behav-
ioral norms within the community and to accept that it is the function
of tort law to use those behavioral norms as the basis for decisionmak-
ing in tort cases, an enormous, though often-ignored, problem contin-
ues to exist. What if the litigants honestly disagree as to what behav-
ior was acceptable under the circumstances?
When such a conflict exists, it is critical that the court deter-
mine whether the disagreement represents a clash between an indi-
vidual's judgment and that of the larger community,34 or whether it
represents a conflict between the norms of behavior held by larger
groups or subgroups within the community. If it is the former, our
legal tradition and commitment to majoritarian rule dictate that the
31. For an explanation of the favorable legal treatment of rescuers in terms of after-the-
fact endorsement of the laudatory conduct, see Kotler, 41 Vand. L. Rev. at 106 (cited in note 8).
32. In writing this Article, I find myself in the somewhat uncomfortable position of having
to retreat from a position taken some years ago arguing that the jury's power should be re-
stricted. See Kotler, 20 Ga. L. Rev. at 168-69 (cited in note 26).
33. We have, of course, come to accept that a judge's or jury's determination of a "mixed
question of law and face' has no precedential value. This proposition has been challenged in the
past. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 146 Mass. 142, 15 N.E. 491, 494 (1888) (Justice Holmes
declaring that a jury's earlier decision was stare decisis).
34. See, for example, Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837) ("Instead,
therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be co.extensive with the judgment of
each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought
rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of
ordinary prudence would observe."). See also Holmes, The Common Law at 77 (cited in note 13)
("[W]hen A assaults or slanders his neighbor, or converts his neighbor's property, he does a
harm which he has never consented to bear, and if the law makes him pay for it, the reason for
doing so must be found in some general view of the conduct which every one may fairly expect
and demand from every other, whether that other has agreed to it or not.").
564 [Vol. 50:555
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standards of the community must prevail.35 If it is the latter, how-
ever, in the absence of legislation, courts are neither empowered to
make the overtly political determination of which group's norms are
to be preferred,36 nor, even if willing to engage in such an illegitimate
process, equipped from a practical standpoint to make such a deter-
mination.37
An illustration may serve to clarify the problem. Assume a
particular political community is made up of two clans. Clan A be-
lieves that all food should be thoroughly cooked. Clan B believes
35. I intentionally exclude from this discussion the entire issue of constitutionally
protected rights.
36. The extent to which it is permissible for judges to engage in overtly "legislative"
policymaking is a hotly debated topic, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. In
the context of tort law, Dean Prosser openly accepted this role for the judiciary. See, for
example, William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1953) ("There is a duty
if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the constitution, is what we make it."). See also
White, Tort Law in America at 163 (cited in note 13) (In his conception of tort law as an
exercise of social engineering Prosser hinted that policy considerations were decisive in the
decision of Torts cases; the popularity of Prosser's treatise suggested that a 'policy' approach to
Torts had become acceptable.").
On the other hand, demonstrating that the judiciary has been engaged in an illegitimate
exercise of political power has been one of the central aims and accomplishments of the Critical
Legal Studies movement. See, for example, Morton J. Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective
Causation in David Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 101 (Pantheon
Books, 1982).
For an objection to judicial "lawmaking" from a freedom of contract perspective, See Richard
A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2193
(1989). As Epstein explains:
[A]l efforts to find better ways to sell and market products are cut off before they are
born, so that new information about product liability terms cannot be generated by
voluntary transactions. Today all doctrinal innovation has to come from the courts,
where the technical lags and information deficits are at their highest. Yet there is no
alternative forum, save legislation, in which to override judgments when they have
proved mistaken; indeed, there is no way to find out whether they are mistaken at all.
Id. at 2202-03 (footnote omitted). For commentary staking out a middle ground that judicially
imposed policies should be at least indirectly based on legislative pronouncement, see Hans A.
Linde, Courts and Torts: "Public Policy" without Public Politics?, 28 Valp. U. L. Rev. 821 (1994).
Judge Linde argues that "[u]nless a court can attribute public policy to a politically accountable
source, it must resolve novel issues of liability within a matrix of statutes and tort principles
without claiming public policy for its own decision. Only this preserves the distinction between
the adjudicative and the legislative function." Id. at 855. See also William Powers, Jr., Judging
Judging, 28 Valp. U. L. Rev. 857 (1994) (commenting on Judge Linde's paper).
37. See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard U., 1982).
Judge, then Dean, Calabresi argued that judges'
capacity to figure out what current majorities wish is surely limited, and their memory
of what was wanted when they were appointed or elected is bound to fade. Their terms
are too long, their staffs are too limited, and their manner of selection too bizarre to give
much support to the notion that judges work well as makers of the common law because
they seek to follow the wishes of the majority....
Id. at 94. But see Shapo, 89 Nw. L. Rev. at 1575 (cited in note 1) (arguing that there are cases
"in which judges are truly better representatives of culture than legislatures").
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equally strongly that all food should be uncooked. Each is convinced
that its preference represents the moral, healthful, and socially
appropriate conduct and that the other's is immoral, unhealthy, and
disgusting. Members of Clan A would never serve sushi at a clan
gathering because to do so would result in intense social disapproval. 38
One possible way to deal with the conflict, of course, is for the
larger group, being the political majority, to lobby the clans' common
legislative body to pass a statute requiring that only (un)cooked food
be served in the community and further providing for civil liability if
anyone is made ill by (un)cooked food. Such legislation would be
legitimate by definition, having been duly enacted by the legislative
body notwithstanding the fact that it interferes with the social norms
and expectations of the minority group. However, such a statute's
wisdom and fairness seem quite questionable since it unnecessarily
imposes alien norms on the minority clan.39
Now assume that a rebellious Clan A teenager chooses to at-
tend a social function sponsored by individuals in Clan B, where he is
served and consumes raw fish. Although the quality of the food is
perfectly acceptable to the Bs, the young man becomes ill because he
is unaccustomed to eating raw food. He then files a civil action
against the individuals who provided him with the food.
If there is a legislative mandate, of course, it will dictate the
outcome. 0 In the absence of legislation, however, how should the
court deal with the case? The judge could, of course, impose his or her
own view. Doing so, however, raises serious legitimacy concerns4'
38. For a discussion of the relationship between informal social sanction and formal legal
institutions, see Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
(Harvard U., 1991).
39. It is important, of course, not to confuse legitimacy and wisdom. As I have pointed out
elsewhere, "inconsistent or unwise lawmaking does not offend majoritarian political theory."
Kotler, 20 Ga. L. Rev. at 164 (cited in note 26).
40. This is not to say that judicial interpretation of legislation creates no legitimacy prob-
lems. Clearly courts can utilize the opportunity to "interpret" legislation to pursue social poli-
cies. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1995) (discussing the theories of legitimacy in the context
of interpretation). Assuming the judge acts to interpret the legislation so as to give effect to the
legislature's intent, however, the problem is not one of legitimacy, but one of accuracy. See also
Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 257 (1970) ("The Court undertakes the task of
interpretation ... not because the Court has any special ability to fathom the intent of
Congress, but rather because interpretation is unavoidable in the decision of the case before it.")
(Black, J., dissenting).
41. Perhaps the most common argument for the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking is that
legislatures can abrogate judge-made law should they disagree. See, for example, John Hart
Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 4-5 (Harvard U., 1980) C'[fln noncon-
stitutional contexts, the court's decisions are subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary
statute. The court is standing for the legislature, and if it has done so in a way the legislature
does not approve, it can soon be corrected."). However, as Judge Calabresi pointed out, this
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and, if it later turned out that the judge was a member of the clan
favored by the decision, the integrity of the judicial system might be
questioned.42
The judge might also attempt to guess how the community
would have legislated, had it chosen to do so, and decide the case
accordingly. However, a judicial attempt to reflect public attitude
necessitates a prediction based on empirical questions that courts are
ill-equipped to answer, and, even if they could, any such decision
would have to be reconsidered whenever the relative clan population
changed or attitudes within the clans changed. 43
Our traditional tort approach only partially solves the prob-
lem. The question of whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable
or unreasonable would be viewed as a "mixed question of law and
fact" and, therefore, a question to be resolved by the jury as represen-
tatives of the community.44 However, the jury will need more
guidance than an instruction simply to decide the reasonableness of
the conduct. It is necessary for them to go a step further by resolving
an additional question: reasonable according to whom-clan A or clan
B?
Analogous problems arise frequently in the real-world context
of tort litigation. Consider, for example, the well known case of
Canterbury v. Spence.45 That case involved the issue of informed
consent within the context of the provision of medical services. It was
argument proves too much: "[Taken literally, it can justify any law, however instituted or
arrived at, so long as a legislature or other majoritarian body can reject it." Calabresi, A
Common Law at 92 (cited in note 37).
42. A finding that the case was not justiciable would serve to implement the norms of clan
B, but it would not solve the problem of determining whose norms should control.
Nevertheless, in cases involving disputes that arise within private social organizations, one
can observe a body of doctrine counseling judges not to get involved. See Dawkins v. Antrobus,
17 Ch. D. 615 (1881) (discussed in Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations
Not for Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993 (1930)). The subject is discussed and illustrated in some
detail in Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 357-65 (Foundation Press, 1958). See also Norman Dorsen,
Paul Bender, and Bert Neuborne, 1 Political and Civil Rights in the United States 1316 (Little,
Brown, 4th ed. 1976) ("Courts have traditionally refrained from reviewing disciplinary actions
against members of social as distinguished from professional associations").
43. But see Shapo, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1575 (cited in note 1) (arguing that in some cases
judges are "better representatives of culture than legislatures ... because in certain circum-
stances... [they can] capture the moral sense of society in a way that legislatures, necessarily
prone to compromise, cannot").
44. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L. J. 1131, 1183-
99 (1991) (arguing that the jury provisions in the Bill of Rights sought to ensure a form of direct
participatory democracy). For a discussion of the jury's role as a political institution, see also
Millon, 18 L. & Social Inquiry (cited in note 26).
45. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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the plaintiff/patient's contention that he had not been advised of a one
percent risk of paralysis inherent in the performance of a
laminectomy. The procedure was performed and paralysis resulted.46
The defendant/physician claimed that his failure to disclose the risk
was in keeping with the "reasonable physician" standard.47 That is,
doctors in his community actually or tacitly agreed that the risk was
too remote to warrant mention, and that revelation of its existence
might discourage individuals from having a procedure which normally
would be beneficial.
The court determined that utilization of the reasonable doctor
standard (judged from the perspective of the medical profession) was
inappropriate. 4 The correct standard was the "reasonable patient"
standard, under which the sufficiency of a doctor's disclosure was to
be judged in light of patients' reasonable expectations. 49 The dispute
thus obliged the court not only to identify the relevant groups (doctors
and patients),50 but also to decide against which group's norms the
physician's conduct would be measured.51
The need for courts to make group selection decisions also
arises in cases in which a defendant's behavior is theoretically not at
issue. For example, the problem can be seen in the context of the
implied warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial
Code. UCC section 2-314 defines "merchantability," in part, in terms
of whether the goods "(a) pass without objection in the trade.., and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used... ." The first incorporates a merchant norm.52  The second
46. Id. at 776-78.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 783-85.
49. Id. at 787.
50. The identification of the relevant groups among which the court must choose typically
does not create a difficult problem. Normally, the nature of the particular dispute before the
court will identify the relevant groups and whether the conffict is between the norms of a
subgroup and larger umbrella group of between two more or less separate groups. For example,
in a case involving snake handling during a religious service, the relevant group norms will be
those of the religious group and the larger community. See State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527
S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975). In a dispute over an insurance contract or over the disclosure of risks
inherent in a medical procedure, insurer-insured or doctor-patient readily present themselves as
the appropriate choices.
51. As will become apparent, however, the court reached the right decision for the wrong
reason. In Canterbury, the court determined that patients norms were to control because this
would promote the dignitary interest of patients. 464 F.2d at 784. By making the group
selection decision turn on the judgment that a patienes autonomy was the paramount value, the
court either imposed its own values on the community or attempted to guess at what values
were held by the community. The first is illegitimate and the second is too chancy. See notes
157-60 and accompanying text.
52. See James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code 294 (West, 1972); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
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often, though not always, represents a consumer norm.53 When a
product meets the expectations of merchants, but disappoints the
expectations of a consumer, whose norms should apply?
Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. 54 is illustrative. In that case,
the consumer damaged his teeth when he bit into the hard shell of a
filbert nut that was in a container of otherwise shelled nuts. The
court focused on whether the product with an occasional shell would
pass without objection in the trade and found that it would-5
Interestingly, the court never explicitly considered the possibility that
consumers and merchants might have differing opinions about the
appropriateness of the defendant's conduct. Since the court failed to
address the group selection issue, the result reached is open to ques-
tion.
It is absolutely critical that courts recognize the potential for
conflicting norms or expectations in these situations. When courts
ignore the issue, an inaccurate analysis of the conflicting claims often
results. For example, in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.56 the court
attempted to reconcile a consumer expectation test and an industry
standard test of product defect. The court asserted that reasonable
consumers expect what reasonable manufacturers produce.57 The
truth of this assertion depends on the assumption that consumers and
manufacturers share the same perspective when judging behavior.
Given the disparity in knowledge about manufacturing, however, this
assumption is often patently false.58
53. See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code at 295 (cited in note 52) (arguing
that "merchantability" represents a standard which is often "nearly synonymous" with
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to the user or consumer under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A). Comments g and i to § 402A define a "defective condition" as one that
is "unreasonably dangerous" in terms of a consumer expectation test.
54. 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976).
55. Id. at 537-38.
56. 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
57. 525 P.2d at 1037. See also Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th
Cir. 1973) ("We see no necessary inconsistency between a seller-oriented standard and a user-
oriented standard when, as here, each turns on foreseeable risks. They are two sides of the
same standard.").
58. See Birnbaum, 33 Vand. L. Rev. at 617 (cited in note 23). In Ryder's Estate v. Kelly-
Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978), the jury was given an instruction
advising the jurors to determine whether a product met consumer expectations by applying a
risk-utility test. In criticizing this approach, Professor Birnbaum noted:
Before the jurors have a chance to figure out the worrisome question of what the
"ordinary knowledge common to the community" is concerning the progression of fatigue
cracks in the gutter area beneath a removable flange, they receive another instruction
purportedly telling them how to make this determination. Unfortunately, this second
instruction has nothing to do with knowledge that can in any realistic sense be said to
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Recognition of the potential for confficting perspectives on
behavior does not completely resolve the problem. When the defen-
dant's group memberships overlap,-5 courts have to decide how
broadly to define the relevant defendant group, particularly when the
behavioral norms of a subgroup fail to conform to the norms of some
larger umbrella group. For example, in Morrison v. MacNamara,60
the court was faced with deciding whether a local standard or na-
tional standard of care should be utilized in a medical malpractice
case. In Morrison, a medical laboratory in the District of Columbia
followed local custom and routinely performed a urethral smear test
with the patient standing. The plaintiff was injured when he fainted
and fell.61 The appellant's evidence demonstrated that the national
standard of care required that the patient sit or lie down during the
test.
62
Once the trial judge has made the "selection decision"-that is,
identified and defined the groups and determined which group's stan-
dard of care is to be used as a yardstick-the fact finder's function is
to determine the content of the relevant group's behavioral norm and
to judge the party's conduct against that relevant standard. It is im-
portant to understand that conduct should never be judged out of
context. If, for example, the case involves the issue of automobile
design, the relevant question will almost invariably be what the de-
signer should have done. However, this inquiry raises the additional
question of "according to whom?" If the group selection decision is
that a consumer expectation test applies, this should mean that the
designer's conduct is judged from the consumers' perspective. If, on
the other hand, an industry standard applies, the designer's conduct
is judged from the industry's perspective. 63
be "common to the community." Rather, the instruction urges the trier of fact to
evaluate the specific technical data offered at trial.
Birnbaum, 33 Vand. L. Rev. at 617 (cited in note 23).
59. By overlapping memberships I mean nothing more than the problem of deciding how
specifically or generally the group should be defined--doctors or neurosurgeons, State X's
doctors or all American doctors.
60. 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. App. Ct. 1979).
61. Id. at 558-59.
62. Id. at 559.
63. One obvious effect of this is evidentiary. Whether a traditional negligence "reasonable
manufacturer" standard or the "reasonable consumer expectation" standard is chosen may well
determine the relevance of proffered evidence. See, for example, Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co.,
102 Wash. 2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097, 1098 (1984) (holding that evidence of industry custom was not
relevant to the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer. See also, Kathleen M. Doyle,
Note, Relevance of Industry Custom in Strict Products Liability, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 195, 197
(1984) ("The central issue in this case involves the orientation of the trier of fact.... [Elvidence
of industry custom (which might show that vans of other manufacturers also slip from park to
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B. Resolving the Problem
1. Where Only One Group Has a Relevant Norm
When a dispute exists between members of different groups,
only one of which has certain expectations, there is no choice but to
formulate an instruction that makes it clear that the defendant's
conduct is to be judged in light of those existing expectations.
Consider, for example, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co,64 a products liability
case that involved the question of whether a pickup truck axle should
have been designed so as to withstand the impact of hitting a five or
six inch stone while the vehicle was traveling at highway speeds. 5 If
we assume that the axle in question was sufficiently strong to satisfy
reverse) would shift the jury's focus from the consumer's expectations to the manufacturer's
actions.").
That courts and commentators are failing to make this distinction has become apparent in
the context of the redrafting of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A by the American Law
Institute. This is illustrated by comments made by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director of the ALI.
He has observed:
Other critics have said that, rather than "reasonable alternative design," the better
formulation would be in terms of "consumer expectations." This alternative has been
carefully debated in the deliberations leading to this draft. A question about this
alternative is: "Expectations concerning exactly what?" In thinking about this question,
the Director at least keeps coming back to an answer in terms of a design that would be
less dangerous. But that answer is the equivalent, at least logically, of "reasonable
alternative design."
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forward to Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability at xvi-ii
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
As noted in the text, however, not only must we consider "expectations concerning what,"
but also "according to whom?" An assumption that a consumer's expectations of how a reason-
able manufacturer will behave are the same as a manufacturers' may well not be warranted.
See notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
64. 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967). See also John E. Montgomery and David G. Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27
S.C. L. Rev. 803 (1976). As Montgomery and Owen explain:
[A]n attempt to determine the consumer's reasonable expectations of safety concerning a
technologically complex product may well be an exercise in futility, for the consumer
may have at most only a generalized expectancy-perhaps more accurately only an
unconscious hope-that the product will not harm him if he treats it with a reasonable
amount of care.
Id. at 823 (footnote omitted). See also Powers, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 796-97 (cited in note 19)
(arguing against the "consumer expectations test"). In this context, it is important not to
confuse consumers' expectations regarding product quality and/or safety and consumers'
expectations regarding manufacturers' conduct. Even though consumers may have no
familiarity with a technologically complex product, they may well have very clear expectations
of how knowledgeable people should behave when confronting either the decision whether to sell
the product at all or how much safety to incorporate into a particular design.
65. Heaton, 435 P.2d at 807.
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industry standards, given the relative risks and utilities of this axle
as compared to other feasible designs,66 and we assume further that
product consumers have no discernible expectations as to what a
designer should have done under these circumstances, then the court
correctly identified truck manufacturers as the appropriate group and
employed the correct standard of behavior, that of the reasonable
truck manufacturer (according to truck manufacturers).67
The same is probably true in most professional malpractice
cases. Laymen will often have no definable expectations regarding
the performance of many activities that require the exercise of profes-
sional judgment or high levels of expertise. Therefore, it will nor-
mally be necessary to assess the professional's conduct against the
relevant professional standards. This is, of course, the approach
normally taken by courts in these cases.
For example, in medical malpractice cases, not only does the
professional standard control, but it must be established by expert
testimony.68 The primary exception to this rule comes into play when
the circumstances make it clear that the defendant-physician's con-
duct is culpable as a matter of common knowledge within the lay-
man's experience. 69 In other words, the group selection issue arises
only when both parties are able to formulate expectations.
2. Where All Parties Share Behavioral Norms
The case in which one party belongs to a group that has a be-
havioral norm relevant to the conduct at issue while the other does
not must be distinguished from the case in which both parties are
either members of the same group or of different groups that share
the same expectations.7" Falling into the latter category are those
66. I assume, arguendo, that risk-utility represents the norm among manufacturers. See
notes 212-18. Any jury instruction should, however, be flexible enough to permit the jury to
determine the content of the group norm so that they can assess the defendanes conduct in light
of that norm. Counsel for the parties should, of course, have wide latitude in establishing what
the norm is.
67. As previously noted, the group's norm is not defined entirely by group practices. See
notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
68. Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 188 &
n.49 (cited in note 17).
69. See, for example, Welte v. Bello, 482 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1992).
70. This is really a group definition problem and will depend on the particular circum-
stances of the case. For example, if the case turns on whether it was necessary to determine
whether a warning need be given to a "sophisticated purchaser," the court would have to resolve
whether a manufacturer and sophisticated purchaser are really members of the same group.
The same type of group definition problem can be seen in cases in which courts impute the
knowledge of an expert to a product manufacturer. Suppose, for example, that the risk inherent
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cases in which the court seeks to determine which of several defen-
dants within the same group should have acted when, in fact, none
did. For example, if harm was caused by everyone's failure to take
certain safety precautions, norms within a group may identify a single
individual as being responsible.
In Verge v. Ford Motor Co.,7' for example, a garbage truck did
not have a backup warning device. Ford manufactured the cab and
chassis and Leach Company manufactured and mounted the trash
compactor unit. Which of the two defendants had the responsibility to
add the warning device was made to turn on "trade custom," the de-
fendants' "relative expertise," and "practicality"-that is, the stage of
production at which installation of the safety device would have been
most feasible. 72 In other words, assuming Ford and Leach share
norms of manufacturer behavior, analysis of the three factors seems
to aid in determining which of the two violated the common norm.
This type of case therefore does not turn on the problem of group
selection.
Likewise, traffic accidents in which the drivers' conduct is at
issue, perhaps the most common class of tort cases, do not normally
raise a group selection problem. This is true since, generally speak-
ing, expectations among drivers regarding driver behavior tend to be
broadly fixed throughout society.73
3. Where Norms Conflict
A much more difficult problem is presented when parties are
members of different groups with significantly different expectations
regarding behavior, such that a particular act will be condemned by
in a particular drug is known within the scientific community, but unknown to a particular
pharmaceutical company. When one defines the group to which the company belongs, it may
well be appropriate to include pharmacologists. In fact, courts have accomplished this by hold-
ing manufacturers to the standard of an expert. See Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., and
Oscar S. Gray, 5 The Law of Torts § 28.4 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1986).
In a commercial context, it is common to find that the parties are members of the same
group; thus, no conflict between group norms is likely to exist. See, for example, Delta Air Lines
Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co. Inc., 238 Cal. App.2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965) (upholding
contractual disclaimers of liability where the parties had equal knowledge of risk).
71. 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978).
72. Id. at 387.
73. Interestingly, it has been demonstrated that automobile insurers have their own
distinct norms regarding driver behavior that are not entirely consistent with drivers' norms.




one group but not the other. The well-known case of Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co. 74 serves to illustrate the issue.
In Grimshaw, Ford, having done a cost-benefit analysis, con-
cluded that the relatively small per unit cost increase that would
result from changing the gas tank design of the Pinto was not cost
justified in the aggregate. 75 Specifically, Ford determined that the
design change would cost roughly three times more than reducing the
number of deaths and injuries associated with the existing design.76
From an industry perspective, it is hard to criticize Ford's
conduct. Cost-benefit analysis is both a necessary and a standard
practice among product designers.77  Consumers, however, are not
used to thinking about lives and injuries in economic terms and
therefore deemed Ford's conduct to be egregious. 78
Cases such as Grimshaw, which involve different groups with
conflicting expectations as to the defendant's conduct, raise two criti-
cal questions: (1) Which group's perspective should be utilized in
assessing the defendant's conduct?; and (2) How does one make such a
determination? The remainder of this Part addresses these issues.
a. The Default Rule
Initially, it is necessary to identify a default rule which is to be
generally applied in the absence of some compelling reason dictating a
contrary choice. Our legal tradition reflects the choice that a person's
conduct is to be judged by reference to the norms of the group in
which the individual is a member, not by the norms of some other
group. Such a rule is supported initially by the perceived unfairness
that results from judging conduct by alien norms. 79
74. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
75. Id. at 369-70. See also Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 Rutgers
L. Rev. 1013, 1020 (1991).
76. Schwartz, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1020 (cited in note 75).
77. Id. at 1037.
78. The jury found Ford liable for compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive
damages. In response to a motion for a new trial, the trial judge reduced the punitive damage
award to $3.5 million. 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
See Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect Litigation,
48 Vand. L. Rev. 609, 625-27 (1995) (recognizing the problem, but not really resolving it).
Professor Schwartz describes the Pinto litigation as "an instance of a 'two cultures' problem. A
culture has developed around public policy analysts that see the risk-benefit criterion as
obviously acceptable; but the culture of public opinion itself tends to regard that criterion as
distressing." Id. at 1044 (footnotes omitted).
79. This notion is clearly reflected in those cases which define the standard of care for
those with physical disabilities. The standard of care is the reasonable person having the same
disability as the defendant. See Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts at 175-76 (cited in note 17).
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Consider, for example, the well known case of Smith v.
Lampe.8° In that case, the defendant, seeking to warn a tug boat that
it was approaching the shore, honked the horn of his automobile.
Unfortunately, the defendant was unaware that this was a prear-
ranged signal to the tug boat captain to go in the direction of the horn.
The captain, thinking he was hearing the prearranged signal, steered
toward the sound, causing a towed barge to strike bottom and sink.8'
The two relevant groups, mariners and non-mariners, could be
expected to act differently under the circumstances. Recognizing the
defendant to be a non-mariner, the court concluded that this standard
would apply to the defendant's conduct, and, judging his conduct by
this standard, he was found not liable.8 2
b. Departure from the Default Rule
Although a "fairness" justification for the default rule seems
intuitively correct, to understand both the rule and the justifications
for departing from it, we must examine the assumptions that underlie
that intuition.
Majoritarian theory within .a pluralistic society such as ours
envisions groups and individuals dealing with one another given a
certain level of equality.8 3 The requisite equality does not deal with
bargaining power, which we know may be unequal, but rather with
equality of access to the political system. If one can participate, one
can, at least in theory, organize, form various alliances, and lobby for
legislation that changes the existing relationships with other groups.84
If the fairness of the default rule depends on this notion of
equality, any interference with or failure to assure the ongoing exis-
tence of this equality may well justify an abandonment of the default
rule and the holding of an individual or group to another's behavioral
norms. More specifically, the decision to assess one person's conduct
80. 64 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1933).
81. Id. at 202.
82. Id. at 203. Aside from the potential unfairness that would result from judging one by
another's standard, it would clearly be inefficient to require members of one group to familiarize
themselves with the norms of members of a group with whom they do not normally interact.
Furthermore, imposing such a high knowledge requirement on individuals may well constitute
an excessive interference with their freedom of action. Indeed, it is difficult to come up with any
justification, on these facts, for holding one to the unknown customs or standards of another
group.
83. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 78-80 (cited in note 41).
84. Id.
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in light of another's expectations or norms must turn on a general
master principle that requires open and honest dealings between
groups and their members.
At this point, one might well question the choice of honesty as
the basic principle as opposed to some other social value. Why not
individual autonomy, or efficiency, or corrective justice, for example?
The answer lies, I think, in the role of the judiciary and in the lack of
consensus regarding values in our society.85 While one can make the
case that goals such as efficiency or autonomy should form the basis
of the tort system, there does not appear to be any social consensus as
to which should govern. Even if there were such a consensus, there is
no assurance that it would hold over the long run.86
There is, however, a consensus insisting on a fundamental
commitment to majority rule, except in those cases that contain
implications for some other fundamental or constitutionally recog-
nized right. Although it is axiomatic that judges should not attempt
to impose their values or seek to give political preference to one group
over another, 7 the judicial imposition of rules that seek to reinforce
open and honest dealings between groups and between individuals is
mandated by the commitment to majoritarian rule in a way that other
social values are not. It is analogous to the importance of the First
Amendment in the electoral process.
Just as free speech and a free press serve to ensure the exis-
tence of an informed electorate participating in the political process,88
85. The search for a core value which can form an appropriate basis of a legal system and
the choice of honesty, rather than efficiency, autonomy, or some other substantive value are far
too involved to lay out completely in this Article. Very briefly, however, I contend that the
legitimate role for the judiciary requires that judges implement existing social norms, rather
than impose their values or the values of small segment of the community. The question that
then arises in the context of this Article is: Given the judicial need to make the "group selec-
tion" decision, can this decision be made in a "norm-implementing" rather than a "norm-impos-
ing" manner? For a judge to make the group selection decision by seeking to promote a particu-
lar value-efficiency or autonomy, for example-would be "norm-imposing" However, for the
judge to seek to promote a particular process (such as majority rule) by which the community
could adopt whatever substantive beliefs its members hold, is norm-implementing.
This argument is set out in length in an article currently in progress that is tentatively
entitled Social Norms and Judicial Rulemaking (on file with the Author).
86. Elsewhere, I have argued at considerable length that societal conceptions of values do,
in fact, change over time. See Martin A. Kotler, Competing Conceptions of Automny: A
Reappraisal of the Basis of Tort Law, 67 Tulane L. Rev. 347 (1992). See also James W. Ely, Jr.,
The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights (Oxford U.,
1992). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. Legal Stud.
253 (1980) (arguing that the claim of changing common law is often overstated).
87. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
88. Professor Ely argues that:
The expression-related provisions of the First Amendment--"Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
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honesty in communication between groups ensures that groups are
aware of what other groups are doing. This allows them to enter the
political arena and employ the normal political processes to effect a
change if they are dissatisfied with another group's conduct and its
real or imagined consequences. Dishonesty in dealings masks the
true nature of the intergroup or interpersonal interaction and makes
it more difficult, or even impossible, for the disadvantaged group to
alter the status quo.89
In common law adjudication, this master principle of open and
honest dealing manifests itself in the tort, contract, and related equi-
table doctrines that impose various consequences for misrepresenta-
tion, concealment, and nondisclosure.90 More importantly for our
purposes, if one has affirmatively misled another or knowingly failed
to correct another's misperception of the true dealings between them,
application of the same basic principle serves as the basis for deter-
mining when it is appropriate to depart from the default rule and
judge one's conduct by the standards of another group.
Although the possible variations in dealings between members
of different groups are far too numerous to catalog here, it is useful to
look at a few common situations where these issues arise.
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances!'-were centrally intended to help make our governmental processes work, to
ensure the open and informed discussion of political issues, and to check our
government when it gets out of bounds.
Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 93-94 (cited in note 41).
89. But see Owen, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 427 (cited in note 22). Professor Owen views
honesty as essential to the promotion and protection of a vision of individual autonomy.
The first key to enriching freedom... lies in truth. People's conceptions of the true
world, their expectations as to how the future will unfold in relation to their choices and
their actions, depend to a large extent on what other people say and do. Truth and
expectations, rooted deeply in autonomy, therefore play a major role in determining
moral accountability for product accidents.
Id. at 462.
90. Although the old rule of caveat emptor once limited the consequences of "mere non-
disclosure" in tort cases, this rule has been largely rejected in that context. See note 101. A
blanket rule against basing an action on nondisclosure has existed to a much lesser degree
when equitable remedies have been sought, particularly in the context of rescission of insurance
contracts. Some courts permit rescission based on negligent or inadvertent failure to disclose
material facts. See, for example, Dinkins v. American National Insurance Co., 154 Cal. Rptr.
775, 781 (1979); Pioneer National Title Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 155 N.J. Super. 332, 382 A.2d 933, 936
(1978); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Coulson, 560 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977);




Returning for a moment to Clans A and B, I assume that most
people's initial reaction was that the young man who consumed Clan
B's raw food and became ill should lose his tort action. The hypo-
thetical did not provide the basis for finding any misrepresentation,
concealment, or nondisclosure. He knew that he was at a Clan B
social function and was aware of their customs. Thus, the default
rule would apply and, since serving wholesome raw food conformed
with the behavioral norms of Clan B, there would be no basis for
imposing liability.
Assume, however, that some Clan B folks decided to open a
restaurant. Recognizing that they could increase business by selling
to Clan A customers, they began an advertising campaign pitched to
Clan A members using the slogan "meals like mom made." The ads
did not mention that the restaurateurs were from Clan B. Assume
that while close inspection of the food would reveal that it was
uncooked, most Clan A customers did not notice and only those who
became ill realized what had happened.
It seems clear that the advertising campaign should influence
the case's outcome. The restaurant owners, having effectively mis-
represented not only what they were selling, but also the group to
which they belonged, can now fairly be held liable for violating the
norms of behavior of Clan A even though they were not, in fact, mem-
bers of that group.
Many similar cases exist in which one's representations affect
the group selection process. Perhaps the clearest example is when, by
word or conduct, an individual misrepresents group membership by
falsely pretending to possess some professional qualification. When
this occurs, courts routinely hold that the standard of care is that of
the reasonable person who actually is a member of the relevant
professional group. In such a situation, it is appropriate to judge the
conduct of the defendant by reference to the standards of the group to
which the individual, in fact, does not belong. Utilizing this approach,
courts have held that the conduct of an unlicensed psychologist should
be judged by the reasonable psychologist standard,91 and that the
91. See, for example, Corgan v. Muehling, 167 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 522 N.E.2d 153, 155
(1988). See also Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at
187 (cited in note 17) ("[It is] the minimum common skill which is to be looked to. If the
defendant represents himself as having greater skill than this, as where the doctor holds
himself out as a specialist, the standard is modified accordingly." (footnotes omitted)).
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behavior of an attorney who claimed to specialize in maritime law
should be assessed with reference to that of true specialists.9 2
In keeping with these cases, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
explains,
An actor undertaking to render services may represent that he has superior
skill or knowledge, beyond that common to his profession or trade. In that
event he incurs an obligation to the person to whom he makes such a represen-
tation, to have, and to exercise, the skill and knowledge which he represents
himself to have.
93
Other areas of law also address misrepresentation as to group
membership, although the precise effect may not be as clear. When
one group consciously sets out to represent expressly or tacitly that it
adheres to the standards of behavior of another group, abandonment
of the default rule may be justified.
The insurance industry's advertising is illustrative. Consider
State Farm's "Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there,"
Nationwide's "Nationwide is on your side," or dozens of other image-
presenting slogans and ad campaigns. Such advertising reflects a
marketing strategy deliberately designed to create the belief in a
prospective policy holder that the insurer will, if necessary, behave
like a somewhat idealized neighbor, friend, or member of the insured's
community. When the insured suffers a loss and makes a claim, it
seems entirely appropriate to judge the insurer's conduct from a pol-
icy holder's perspective rather than an insurance industry perspec-
tive. In fact, to a significant extent this is what has occurred.
Although many courts continue to apply traditional contract law and
enforce policy language as written, numerous decisions have expressly
sought to satisfy the reasonable expectation of the insured even in the
face of policy language that would otherwise mandate a different
result.94
92. There appears to be a split in authority as to whether attorneys holding themselves
out as specialists should be held to a higher standard. In Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194
(1975), the court held that "a lawyer holding himself out to the public and the profession as
specializing... must exercise the skill, prudence, and diligence exercised by other specialists."
Id. at 199. In an older line of cases exemplified by Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934),
however, the courts found that a general practitioner standard was applicable to a criminal
defense attorney. The issue is discussed in Richard J. Schnidman and Mark J. Salzler, The
Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will New Standards of Care Place Professional Liability Insurance
Beyond the Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U. Cin. L. Rev. 541 (1976).
93. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A cmt. d.
94. For a discussion of the "reasonable expectation of the insured," see generally Robert E.
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967
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While behavioral image advertising is more common among
service firms95 than product sellers, concern about this type of
misrepresentation often lurks below the surface in product liability
cases. To understand the issue fully, however, it is critical to
distinguish the argument being made here from another view of the
role of misrepresentation, namely that of Professor Shapo.96 His
"representational theory" of products liability focuses on product
sellers' implicit and explicit representations about the products they
sell-that is, "product portrayal."97  While this approach frequently
offers enormous insight into product liability law, it understates what
I believe to be the issue. The fundamentally important implicit or
explicit representations do not deal only with such things as the
(1970) (asserting that the reasonable expectation principle "incorporates the proposition that
policy language will be construed as laymen would understand it and not according to the
interpretation of sophisticated underwriters"). To a significant extent, Judge Keeton's argu-
ment for honoring the reasonable expectation of the insured was based on "expectations created
by policy language and structure and by marketing patterns and general practices" of the
insurers. Id. at 973.
See George B. Trubow, Dubosz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.: Representations in
Insurance Advertising Brochures as Part of the Insurance Contract, 17 John Marshall L. Rev.
969 (1984) (discussing the effect of advertising brochures); Dobosz v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 120 Ill. App.3d 674, 458 N.E.2d 611 (1983) (holding that advertising brochure was
part of insurance policy and controlled over inconsistent language in the policy itself); Sparks v.
Republic National Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982) (finding that advertising
brochure should be considered as it will affect the ordinary person's understanding of the
meaning of the words in the policy itself); Vogel v. American Warranty Home Service Corp., 695
F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding insurer estopped from asserting the existence of policy
language which was inconsistent with language in an advertising brochure on which insured
relied). But see Merseth by Merseth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 390 N.W.2d 16, 18
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that reliance on an advertisment was not enough to overcome
clear exclusion); Hackethal v. National Casualty Co., 189 Cal. App.3d 1102, 234 Cal. Rptr. 853
(1987) (finding terms in brochure were "succinct' but not in conflict with actual terms of the
policy); Mason v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 148 Ariz. 271, 714 P.2d 441 (1985)
(finding that no reasonable person reading the sales brochure could believe there was coverage);
Suarez v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 206 Cal. App.3d 1396, 254 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1988)
(finding that failure to specify in advertising brochure that the policy covered only actual loss of
a hand or foot, and not loss of use, was not fraudulent).
95. Banks and other financial institutions come to mind. 'You'll find a friend at Chase
Manhattan" is one example.
96. See Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974).
Professor Shapo, however, does not see the importance of representations as resting on a
commitment to majoritarian politics. As he asserts in a recent article critical of the proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: "A products restatement should declare, in blackletter when
possible, the importance of the factors of information and sophistication relative to both sellers
and consumers. This is important because these factors, which prove crucial in so many
products cases, provide a meeting ground for considerations of both morality and efficiency."
Shapo, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 697 (cited in note 1).
97. Shapo, 60 Va. L. Rev. at 1113 (cited in note 96). Product portrayal is "broadly defined
as ranging from specific performance claims to subtle utilization of the social consensus
concerning product function as a background for sales messages." Id. at 1115.
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product's quality, safety, or physical properties. Rather, the
representations that may be most important are those which, directly
or indirectly, say something about behaviorial norms.98
Thus, for example, when Michelin shows the image of children
riding in an automobile and announces that it is aware that "so much
is riding on your tires," it is not only asserting that its tires are of
high quality but is also making a statement of concern for the families
of purchasers. Such images represent that the purchasers (if only
they knew) would feel that the manufacturer is exercising a high level
of care to protect their loved ones.
Given the difficulty of establishing a causal link between this
type of general advertising and the occurrence of a specific harm
alleged to be compensable, it is not surprising that mention of image-
creating advertising rarely, if ever, provides the explicit justification
for the decision in products cases. Nevertheless, as Professor Shapo
has observed in the course of discussing representations of product
performance:
Generalized assurances form an important thread in many products frustra-
tion decisions. Occasionally they may create the action; often they provide cru-
cial background support; one surmises that they lie inarticulate behind many
decisions; and one suspects that effective advocacy could have brought out
their thread in quite a few cases in which no mention of them appears. 99
ii. Nondisclosure of Group Norms
More basic than outright misrepresentation, however, is the
question of whether a conscious decision to engage in a business
transaction with another group, knowing that behaviorial norms are
not shared and that the other group's members are probably ignorant
of that fact, justifies a departure from the default rule. Such a result
certainly does not seem unfair. When one exploits a known inequality
by doing business with a group with different norms of behavior and
fails to lay out the behavioral ground rules in advance, one should not
98. Returning, for a moment, to the insurance cases, when State Farm creates the belief
that they will act "like a good neighbor," they are not saying anything specific about the product
they are selling, but about the level of regard they have and will show for their customers
should the occasion arise.
99. Shapo, 60 Va. L. Rev. at 1202 (cited in note 96) (footnote omitted).
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be permitted to complain that he or she is being treated unfairly when
judged from the other's perspective. 00
Even more importantly, the failure to correct a known
misperception has the effect of interfering with the other's ability to
enter the political process in the same way as outright deception.
Thus, the commitment to majoritarian principles requires that this
failure to correct be treated the same. 101 Interestingly, this theoretical
justification for abandoning the default rule in cases of nondisclosure
is mirrored by the development of legal doctrine that can be explained
in terms of the courts doing exactly that.
Consider, for example, the sale of mismanufactured goods to
consumers and the virtual unanimity that surrounds the decision to
impose liability when injury results.0 2 Manufacturers are aware that,
depending on the level of quality control adopted, a certain percentage
of products will fail to meet the manufacturer's own specifications. 0 3
100. Thus, for example, a business operating outside of its own country can fairly be judged
under the law and within the culture of the other country unless some arrangements to the
contrary are agreed upon in advance.
Elsewhere, I have argued at length that tort law could be understood in terms of
punishment of those who engaged in what I termed "insider trading."
[Tihere is a community sense that it is unfair to use knowledge which is solely in one's
possession or at least, as a practical matter, available only to one, for one's own
advantage, generally pecuniary. This community sense has long been reflected in the
development of formal tort doctrine. Thus much of tort law as it affects deliberative
conduct, motivated by a desire to benefit oneself, can be seen as a ban on a certain form
of "insider trading": a means by which a certain species of fraud is punished by the
imposition of damages or by the development and application of harsher legal doctrine.
Kotler, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1255 (cited in note 4).
101. Increasingly, it has been the trend to recognize such nondisclosure as the equivalent of
affirmative misrepresentation. See, for example, Jenkins v. McCormick, 184 Kan. 842, 339 P.2d
8, 11 (1959) (finding an obligation to disclose defects in property which are not known or easily
discoverable by the buyer). See also the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 which provides, in
part, as follows:
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the
other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same
liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that
he has failed to disclose, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise
reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to disclose to the other before
the transaction is consummated...
(e) Facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into
it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship
between them, the customs in the trade or other objective circumstances, would
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
102. See, for example, Powers, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 782-83 (cited in note 19) (noting that
products with "[fllaws have usually been considered to be per se defective.. ."). See also
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liablity, Reporters' Note to § 2, cmt. b (Proposed Final
Draft) (collecting cases, statutes and commentary).
103. Whether a manufacturer's conscious decision to set quality control levels is analogous
to conscious design choice is a matter that is the subject of some disagreement. The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liablity § 2, cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft), asserts that
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Nevertheless, from a manufacturer's perspective, a given quality
control decision may be entirely reasonable.
Consumers, on the other hand, having far less information
about manufacturing, may well expect everything they buy to be free
of manufacturing defects and often will infer culpability from the fact
of defect. 114  Given that marketing considerations normally preclude
manufacturers from disclosing information about the likelihood of
mismanufacture,1 5 the nondisclosure necessary to require abandon-
ment of the default rule will often exist. Thus, if manufacturers are
judged under a manufacturer standard, there will likely be no basis
for the imposition of liability. Nevertheless, the opposite result occurs
because the defendant is being judged from the consumers' perspec-
tive.
Along the same lines, in the unfit food cases a majority of ju-
risdictions have adopted a consumer expectation test.106 While com-
mercial food producers may recognize the inevitability of chicken
bones in pot pies and cherry pits in cherry pies, absent an adequate
warning it is easy to find an industry-wide failure to correct
unrealistic expectations held by consumers.
the two are not analogous. Professor Shapo disagrees. See Shapo, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 660
(cited in note 1).
104. As Dean Prosser has stated:
When seeking a recovery on the theory that a product was defective when sold by the
defendant, plaintiff has substantially the same proof problems for recovering on a theory
of strict liability as he does on a theory of negligence. Under both theories plaintiff must
establish to the satisfaction of the jury a defect at the time of sale. Once the proof is
sufficient to get to the jury on the existence of a defect, there is generally a basis for an
inference of negligence.
Page Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Torts, 23 Sw. L. J. 1, 1 (1969).
105. Professor Shapo observes:
Consumers typically still have very little knowledge about the production processes that
send even simple products to market, for example, the tests used to detect defects in
shatterable bottles. Moreover, most product sellers would not be inclined to provide
relevant statistics ("Caution: Under the testing system used in this plant, one bottle in
50,000 will explode in normal use").
Shapo, Products Liability at 52 (cited in note 1). Epstein further explains:
There are very few occasions in which the manufacturer would want to contract out,
precisely because any disclaimer---"not responsible for botulism," or "not responsible for
exploding bottles that cause serious bodily injuries in ordinary use"--does convey to the
consumer all the information that he needs to have in order to decide to buy elsewhere.
Epstein, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2203 (cited in note 36). In fact, the truth is not only
undisclosed, but may well be concealed by advertising campaigns, often seek to portray
manufacturers as expending an unrealistically high level of attention to the pursuit of
perfection.
106. See Stacy L. Mojica, Note, Breach of Implied Warranty: Has the Foreign/Natural Test
Lost Its Bite?, 20 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 377, 394 n.90 (1990) (providing a state-by-state break-
down).
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Thus, as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, an application
of the group selection process would result in the utilization of a
consumer expectation test rather than an industry custom test.10 7
This outcome is entirely consistent with legal doctrine.
c. Reestablishing the Default Rule
For the same reasons that nondisclosure of behavioral norms
in the face of inequality of knowledge between groups may justify
holding a party to the standards of a group to which he or she does
not belong, adequate disclosure provides sufficient reason for
demanding that the default rule be applied. This intuitively obvious
conclusion is illustrated by the approach taken by the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in the case of "unavoidably unsafe"
products. 108 As I will explain below, section 402A reverses the
traditional approach of judging a defendant's conduct by his or her
own group's standard and generally mandates that judgments be
made from the consumer's perspective. 109 In comment k, however, the
drafters allow the manufacturer to change the standard to an
industry standard by providing the consumer with an adequate
warning."0
107. Of course, use of a consumer expectation test does not ensure that the plaintiff will
recover. As one court has noted,
There is a distinction between what a consumer expects to find in a fish stick and in a
baked fried fish, or in a chicken sandwich made from sliced white meat and in a roast
chicken. The test should be what is reasonably expected by the consumer in the food as
served ....
Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64, 68-69 (1960).
108. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. k.
109. See text accompanying notes 199-203.
110. This, however, raises another question that has not been adequately resolved. While a
warning serves to eliminate a claim of concealment or nondisclosure that might justify rejecting
the default rule, when a case turns on the adequacy of a warning, from whose perspective is
"adequacy" addressed? The manufacturers? The consumers? Or someone else's? See notes
223-27 and accompanying text.
Examination of the "learned intermediary" cases leads one to believe that it is the manufac-
turer's perspective. Although the manufacturer must warn doctors in the case of prescription
drugs and consumers in the case of over-the-counter drugs, industry custom seems to be the
prevailing test. Of course, industry custom takes into consideration the expertise and
sophistication of the target consumer group. See generally Barbara Marticelli McGarey,
Comment, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer-Directed Information-Enhancing the
Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 117, 122-29 (1984); M. Stuart Madden, The
Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 221, 285-98
(1987). See also George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 Cardozo L.
Rev. 2301 (1989). Professor Priest, discussing the warning requirement established by comment
j to section 402A asserts:
Comment j represented a small step toward addressing consumer losses [resulting from
design defects] which otherwise were denied under the founders' strict liability
584
RECONCEPTUALIZING STRICT LIABILITY
Courts have followed the same type of approach in many in-
surance policy cases.111 Consider, for example, Collister v. Nationwide
Insurance Co,112 in which the court had to decide whether to enforce
the language of a conditional receipt given to an applicant for life
insurance. The conditional receipt specifically provided that there
would be no coverage provided until the applicant satisfactorily
completed a physical examination. 13 The applicant died in an
automobile accident before he was able to have the exam. 114
In finding that the insurer's acceptance of a premium payment
from the applicant created a temporary contract of insurance, the
court specifically looked at what applicants expect given the social
realities of a meeting with an insurance salesman. The court ob-
served:
The payment marks the beginning of performance.... At that point, the con-
sumer is put in a position, of either accepting the receipt as a receipt and noth-
ing more, or put in a position in which he must ask the insurance agent to re-
main silent so that he, the consumer, might have an opportunity to read and
study the document. Furthermore, the consumer might be reluctant to read
the document aware that such conduct might imply a mistrust of the person
with whom he has already made an agreement, generally after lengthy and
personal discussions. 115
Having adopted a "reasonable expectation of the insured" ap-
proach to the applicant's rights under the policy, the court, in effect,
determined that the insurer's conduct was to be judged from the per-
spective of insureds. The court specifically noted, however, that the
insurer could successfully defend if it could show that the applicant
had actually been told of the conditional nature of the coverage that
the insurer intended to provide." 6
In general, then, the complete disclosure mandated by the
honesty principle will ensure the application of the default rule.
approach. According to Comment j, though generally free from liability without
negligence, a manufacturer knowing that there exists some set of particularly
susceptible consumers is required to provide a warning reporting the produces
ingredients.
Id. at 2323-24.
111. For a discussion of the similarities in marketing insurance and "more tangible
products," see Shapo, Products Liability at 75 (cited in note 1).
112. 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978).
113. Id. at 1346.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1354.
116. Id. at 1354-55.
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IV. NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
AND GROUP SELECTION
To this point, I have been discussing the assessment of conduct
in terms of a default rule whereby one's conduct is measured against
norms established by the group in which one is a member and the
"political" rationale for rejection of that rule. The default rule is, in
fact, a fairly traditional version of negligence doctrine under which an
individual's conduct is judged by a community standard, professional
standard, or some other behavioral norm established by the group of
which that person is a member."n Which group that will be, of course,
depends on the context in which harm was caused to another."8
There is, however, enormous linguistic and doctrinal confusion
within traditional negligence law." 9 Although one is normally judged
by reference to one's own group norms, there are numerous cases in
which a member of one group is judged by another group's standard.
Consider, for example, the traditional tort rule that refuses to recog-
nize a party's insanity in evaluating his or her conduct,120 or the rule
that holds children to an adult standard of care under some circum-
stances. 121 Each represents the imposition of liability without con-
ventional fault, although conduct is still the issue. In effect, these
cases impose what can be called "behavioral strict liability" even
though this strict liability is hidden within the terminology of
negligence.122
The same issue may arise within the context of contributory
negligence. Consider Dean Prosser's query:
Suppose the individual has led a life that has not brought him into contact
with information common in the particular community. A city dweller who
never has seen a bull or a mule, or heard anything about their characteristics,
117. Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 184
(cited in note 17).
118. In the abstract, the group selection process may appear more problematic than it
actually is. The nature of the litigation will normally identify the relevant groups. Where one
is injured by a product that he or she purchased, for example, the relevant groups are probably
manufacturers and consumers. The fact that the consumer may also be an accountant, a
Protestant, and a member of the Rotary Club would have no apparent significance. See also
note 50.
119. See also Powers, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 790-91 (cited in note 19) (discussing the problem of
linguistic confusion in the judicial attempts to distinguish negligence and defectiveness).
120. Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 176-77
(cited in note 17).
121. Id. at 181 (using an adult standard where the child "engages in an activity that is
normally one of adults only...").




visits a friend in the country, and makes a misguided attempt to fraternize
with the animals.1
23
Although the city dweller's conduct is entirely reasonable from his
perspective, a "contributory negligence" defense is allowed. "[T]he
standard of ordinary knowledge will still be applied, and it is the
individual who must conform to the community, rather than vice
versa."124 The effect is once again a form of behavioral strict
liability-the utilization of the plaintiffs faultless (from his perspec-
tive) conduct as a defense.
This type of linguistic and doctrinal confusion is compounded
in the "strict liability" cases. The so-called "pockets of strict liabil-
ity' 125 found throughout tort law contain remarkably diverse bodies of
legal doctrine-trespassing cattle, wild animals, abnormally danger-
ous (or ultrahazardous) activities, defective product liability, vicarious
liability (common law and statutory), and statutory compensation
systems, for example. Notwithstanding the enormous surface diver-
sity of these cases, a close examination reveals that apart from those
cases that are simply traditional negligence cases that have been
mislabeled, 126 there are primarily two separate bases for imposing
liability.
The first and most common way of thinking about strict liabil-
ity can be termed "non-behavioral" strict liability. It can be under-
stood in purely instrumental terms-the imposition of liability for
reasons completely divorced from any assessment of the parties' in-
jury-causing conduct. For example, scholars discussing this theory of
strict liability may utilize a concept of liability without fault where
causation by itself is sufficient to shift a loss from the plaintiff to the
123. William L. Prosser, John W. Wade and Victor E. Schwartz, Cases and Materials on
Torts 153 n.4 (Foundation Press, 8th ed. 1988) (citing Tolin v. Terrell, 133 Ky. 210, 117 S.W. 290
(1909)).
124. Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 184
(cited in note 17). See also Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1147
(1942); Fleming James, Jr. and David K. Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in
Negligence Trials, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 697 (1952).
125. The phrase is taken from Fletcher, 85 Harv. L. Rev. at 542 (cited in note 7).
126. The common law rule that the possessor of a domestic animal was subject to "strict
liability" is a good example of a mislabeled negligence case inasmuch as "[t]o be strictly liable,
the possessor must have known or had reason to know of a dangerous propensity or trait that
was not characteristic of a domestic animal of like kind." Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 542 (cited in note 17).
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defendant.12 7 Thus understood, non-behavioral strict liability repre-
sents an instrumental cost-allocation decision that a particular enter-
prise or class of defendants should bear the costs of certain types of
harms, regardless of whether a particular defendant could have
avoided or even foreseen that the loss might have occurred.128
Under this approach, holding the master liable for the torts of
his servant internalizes the accident costs generated by employees'
employment-related activities into the enterprise benefitting from
those activities. 29 Worker's compensation legislation serves to inter-
nalize workplace injury costs. 30 Similarly, in some of the dangerous
activity cases, the enterprise that generates the harm must pay com-
pensation as part of the cost of doing business because this cost allo-
cation serves some other goal.13
Although a non-behavioral strict liability approach has become
part of the accepted legal landscape in the vicarious liability and
worker's compensation cases, courts have demonstrated an extraord-
inary reluctance to adopt such an approach in the dangerous activity
and products cases."32 In fact, in both of these areas one can observe
127. See, for example, A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 41
(Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1989); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. Legal Stud.
205 (1973); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2-3 (1980).
128. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985). See
also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of
Enterprise Liability Under TForeseeable and Insurable Law, H, 69 Yale L. J. 794 (1960);
Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics at 41 (cited in note 127). But see Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973) (developing a theory of strict
liability to protect individual autonomy).
Professor Henderson sees the courts' adoption of strict liability as a way of avoiding having
to make polycentric decisions regarding product safety. He has argued:
In terms of its effect on the courts' capacity to adjudicate the issues, the strict liability
rule is identical to the no duty rule. Under both, courts avoid the necessity of
establishing product safety standards by refusing to pass judgment upon the
reasonableness of defendants' efforts at quality control; but by substituting
manufacturers' liability for manufacturers' immunity, the substantive policy objections
to the no duty-privilege approach are overcome.
Henderson, 73 Colum. L. Rev. at 1546 (cited in note 24).
129. See, for example, Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) ("The basis of
respondeat superior has been correctly stated as 'the desire to include in the costs of operation
inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the
burden among those benefited by the enterprise.' ") (quoting Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour,
23 Colum. L. Rev. 716, 718 (1923)).
130. Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 573
(cited in note 17) (The human accident losses of modern industry are to be treated as a cost of
production, like the breakage of tools or machinery. The financial burden is lifted from the
shoulders of the employee, and placed upon the employer, who is expected to add it to his costs,
and so transfer it to the consumer.").
131. Id. at 556.
132. See notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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an initial endorsement of a non-behavioral approach by some courts
followed by a retreat from this approach in favor of linking the impo-
sition of liability to the assessment of the parties' conduct. 133
It is important to understand, however, that the widespread
rejection of a non-behavioral approach has not signaled a return to
traditional negligence. Instead, the prevailing conception of "strict
liability," as it has been employed by the courts, has moved from a
conception of no-fault enterprise liability to a conception of
"behavioral strict liability." Under this approach, an individual's
conduct is judged against an identifiable group norm, even if the per-
son being judged is not a member of the group from whose perspective
his conduct is assessed. In other words, this approach also embraces
a fault-based concept representing, in the language used here, a rejec-
tion of the default rule.
Consider, for example, Guille v. Swan,134 an early-nineteenth-
century dangerous, activity case heavily relied upon by Judge Posner
in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.135 In
Guille, the defendant's hot air balloon landed in the plaintiffs New
York City garden, which was subsequently trampled by rescuers. As
Judge Posner observed, "[t]he owner of the garder sued the balloonist
for the resulting damage, and won. Yet the balloonist had not been
careless. In the then state of ballooning it was impossible to make a
pinpoint landing."13 6
To consider the case using the terminology employed here, the
defendant balloonist's conduct had complied with the balloonist stan-
dard of care. From the New York City gardener's perspective, how-
ever, flying around out of control may not have been so reasonable
and perhaps the finding of liability reflected that judgment.137
Whether the case was correctly decided under the model devel-
oped here is a separate question and is debatable. The basis for
133. See Birnbaum, 33 Vand. L. Rev. at 593 (cited in note 23) (tracing the shift in products
cases); Epstein, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2227 (cited in note 20) (discussing the shift in the
imposition of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities from the First to Second
Restatements of Torts).
134. 19 Johnson's Rep. (N.Y.) 381 (1822).
135. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
136. Id. at 1177.
137. A common source of confusion in cases such as this lies in the failure to distinguish
the various factual theories of liability which may be available. Both the analysis and outcome
may vary depending on whether the conduct that is alleged to give rise to liability is identified
as the the decision to go ballooning in a particular place, as distinct from how the ballooning
was actually done thereafter.
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abandoning the default rule-that is, rejecting traditional negligence
and adopting behavioral strict liability-is nondisclosure or conceal-
ment that interfered with the gardener's ability to enter the political
process to seek protection, presumably legislative restrictions on hot
air ballooning. If the ballooning activity had been kept a secret or if
there had been some misrepresentation about the potential dangers,
perhaps the case was correctly decided.138
In any event, the same "behavioral versus non-behavioral strict
liability" split also is apparent in the products cases. There is certainly much
academic literature explaining the imposition of strict liability in tort for
product-related harm purely in instrumentalist terms,139 and an occasional
lonely voice is still heard to urge the wisdom of totally disregarding the
parties' conduct. 40 The courts'4 ' and most commentators, however, have
become hostile toward this view, often deriding it as "absolute liability,"42 or,
according to one commentator, "strict, strict liability."43
138. Arguably, the language in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520(e) making the
appropriateness of the area where the activity is done a factor in determining whether the
conduct gives rise to liability in tort has some bearing on this. If one cannot anticipate that an
activity will be engaged in or appreciate the risks involved, this may evidence a form of nondis-
closure that justifies abandonment of the default rule.
139. See, for example, Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 Yale L. J. 499, 500-07 (1961); Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An
Analysis and Proposal, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 439, 462-72 (1972); Milton Katz, The Function of Tort
Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. Cin. L. Rev. 587, 636-62 (1969).
140. See, for example, Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict
Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1183 (1992).
141. The two most obvious illustrations of courts moving toward instrumentalist strict
liability are Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) and
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). See also
Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812, 579 P.2d 940 (1978); Dougherty v. Hooker
Chemical Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d
809 (9th Cir. 1974). Beshada was effectively overruled by Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97
N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (1984). Cunningham was legislatively overruled. See Ill. Ann. Stat.
§ 5102 (Smith-Hurd, 1988).
142. Henderson, 73 Colum. L. Rev. at 1554 (cited in note 24) ("Despite the institutional
advantages it might hold, absolute manufacturers' liability has been unanimously and
emphatically rejected by the courts."). Another commentator has asserted:
[The evolution of standards in both design and warning cases have been strongly
directed by the concepts of risk distribution and cost internalization. The direction of
this influence has been toward absolute liability. [The drafters of section 402A] stated
with great emphasis that the strict liability standard that they were proposing stopped
far short of absolute liability.
Priest, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2326-27 (cited in note 110). See also Wertheimer, 60 U. Cin. L.
Rev. at 1189 (cited in note 140) ("[S]trict products liability is not now, and never was intended to
be, absolute liability."); James A. Henderson, Jr. and Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479 (1990)
(demonstrating that courts have moved from a strict liability test towards utilization of
negligence principles).
The primary exception to the movement away from non-behavioral strict liability, of course,
is found in the vicarious liability cases, in which courts have come to accept that the
relationship between the primary tortfeasor and some other party forms a sufficient basis for
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The linguistic and doctrinal confusion in strict product liability
law was further compounded in the 1960s and 1970s by the develop-
ment of the so-called "hindsight" test for design defects. The problem
arose as courts and commentators attempted to deal with injuries
caused by products that appeared to be reasonably safe when made,
but which later turned out to be relatively unsafe. The change in
perception regarding safety may arise because the product contained
some generic danger that was unrecognized when it was
manufactured; because people began to use the product in a way or
for a use that was not originally anticipated; or because changes in
technology permitted similar, but safer, products to be developed and
marketed some time after the product in question.'"
During the 1960s and 1970s, it was first proposed that the
"defectiveness" of such products could be determined by assessing the
actual danger of these products in light of all that was known at the
time of trial, regardless of whether information regarding the full
extent of risk was known or even knowable at the time the product
was first sold.4 5 Particularly in the "generic risk" cases, many courts
sought to assess the manufacturer's liability by imputing knowledge
of the actual dangerousness of the product to the manufacturer and
then assessing the manufacturer's hypothetical negligence. In the
language of Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.:146
A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable person would
not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful charac-
ter. The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the
article knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts to
constructive knowledge of the condition of the product. 14 7
holding that other party liable to the plaintiff: See generally Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69 at 499 (cited in note 17).
143. Victor E. Schwartz and Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product
Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 Denver U. L. Rev. 685, 687-89 (1988).
144. David A. Fischer and William Powers, Jr., Products Liability: Cases and Materials
218 (West, 2d ed. 1994).
145. W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398,
408-09 (1970); W. Page Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the
Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 559, 568 (1969); John W. Wade, Strict
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L. J. 5, 15-16 (1965).
146. 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
147. Id. at 1036 (footnotes omitted). This issue is not only clearly illustrated by the
"unknowable generic risk" products design cases, but on occasion in a failure to warn context as
well. In Beshada, 447 A.2d at 539, the court assumed that the risks of asbestos were
unknowable when the product was marketed but known at the time of trial. Nevertheless,
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The attempt to utilize the language of conduct assessment as
the analytical tool for imposing non-behavioral strict liability,
however, did not clarify "strict liability." Instead, it exacerbated the
confusion that already existed as a result of the use of the phrase
"strict liability in tort" to describe two very different approaches to
tort law.18  This confusion is clearly evidenced by the most common
objection to the hindsight approach-namely, that it is unfair.19
Since the defendant could not have known of the danger, the
defendant could not have designed that danger out of the product or
warned about it. Therefore, it would be unfair to impose liability on
this basis. 5"
But criticism of this sort misses the point.'5 ' The Wade/Keeton
approach was not intended to assess the culpability of the defendant's
conduct, but rather to use the defendant's hypothetical negligence as
an analytical tool to determine the existence of a "defect." Once the
"defect" was established, however, strict liability could be imposed in
furtherance of goals unrelated to any assessment of conduct.152 To
criticize this approach as unfair erroneously presupposes that it was
intended to be a vehicle for the assessment of conduct.
Additionally, the mere fact that the charge of unfairness has
been repeatedly leveled against the "imputation of the unknowable" or
"hindsight" approach reveals the existence of a deeply held belief or
using a "hindsight' test, the court imputed knowledge of the danger to the defendant and, since
the lack of a warning made the product unsafe, found the product to be defective.
148. See Epstein, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2198-99 (cited in note 36) (arguing that Professor
Wade's "hindsighf' test contributed to the "inadvertent way in which product liability doctrine
has grown up").
149. See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, cmt. a
(Proposed Final Draft) C'[Manufacturers may persuasively ask to be judged by a normative
behavior standard to which it is reasonably possible for manufacturers to conform. For these
reasons, Subsections (b) and (c) speak of products being defective only when risks were
reasonably foreseeable.").
150. See note 19 (discussing Professor Coleman's explanation of this type of objection).
151. See Shapo, Products Liability at 49 (cited in note 1) (To the rejoinder that this is an
imposition of liability without a showing that the defendant should or even could have known of
the risk, the response is: Yes, that is the meaning of strict liability.").
152. I do not mean to suggest that Dean Wade developed the "hindsight" test with the
intention of establishing an instrumentalist tort regime, although that may have been a conse-
quence. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior
to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 734 (1983). As Dean Wade stated:
I now would be inclined to think that there is no longer any particular value in using the
assumed-knowledge language. Its usefulness, I thought, was in explaining the concept
of strict liability when it was new by clearly contrasting it with negligence in which the
defendant's actual culpability in failing to learn of the dangerousness of the product had
to be shown. It always had overtones of fiction, and, like all fictions, it can create
difficulties if taken literally.
Id. at 764 (footnote omitted).
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tacit assumption that conduct should be the central concern of tort
law.153  If Professor Shapo's "cultural mirror" metaphor is cor-
rect-and I believe that it is-the rejection of a non-behavioral strict
liability approach is not surprising. As long as the dominant percep-
tion of the tort system is punishment of unacceptable conduct, the
imposition of liability absent such culpability is sure to meet with
disapproval.
Just as it is clear that non-behavioral approaches have failed
to gain acceptance, however, it is equally clear that some liability
regime other than traditional negligence is being implemented. I
submit that the model explicated in this Article captures the notion of
strict liability that has emerged in design defect cases such as
Grimshaw and the manufacturing defect cases previously discussed.154
Moreover, understanding that behavioral strict liability is
being utilized in many products cases allows one to make sense of
those decisions permitting the utilization of a comparative fault
defense. 155 While critics of the defense maintain that it is logically
incoherent to ask a jury to compare the fault of the plaintiff to the no-
fault strict liability of the defendant,156 such criticism loses all force
when one realizes that a defendant's liability in those cases is not
instrumentalist non-behavioral strict liability, but rather depends on
an assessment of the defendant's conduct. When seen in this light, no
logical impediment to the comparison of the parties' behavior exists.
More importantly, aside from its value as a description of the
tort system, I submit not only that there are defensible reasons for
preferring the group selection model developed here to either non-
153. See, for example Andrew T. Berry, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.:
Revolution-or Aberration-in Products Liability Law, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 786 (1984)
(criticizing the "hindsight approach"); John E. Keefe and Richard C. Henke, Presumed
Knowledge of Danger: Legal Fiction Gone Awry?, 19 Seton Hall L. Rev. 174 (1989) (arguing for
the abandonment of the "Wade-Keeton approach"); William R. Murray, Jr., Comment, Requiring
Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71 Geo. L. J.
1635 (1983); Nicholas B. Simonetta, Note, Defeat for the State-of-the-Art Defense in New Jersey
Products Liability: Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 14 Rutgers L. J. 953 (1983). But
see Wertheimer, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1183 (cited in note 140) (supporting the hindsight test).
This is not to say that the "hindsighf' test has been completely abandoned. Particularly in
the so-called "generic risk" cases, the approach continues to have some vitality. See, for exam-
ple, Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 942 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991); Robertson v. General Tire &
Rubber Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 11, 462 N.E.2d 706 (1984); Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
557 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
154. See text accompanying notes 75-78 and 102-107.
155. See, for example, Daly, 575 P.2d at 1162.
156. Id. at 1178. See also id. at 1178 (Jefferson, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing
that a comparative fault defense is logically inconsistent with a strict liability cause of action).
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behavioral strict liability or traditional negligence approaches, but
that a fundamental commitment to majoritarian rule demands it.
Certainly there are powerful justifications for an instrumentalist
approach to tort law. Cost internalization may well result in the most
efficient allocation of resources, promote individual autonomy, or
further some notion of corrective justice or some other personal moral
principle. 157 The problem, however, is that in the absence of a legis-
lative mandate, the underlying goal of an instrumentalist approach
will not necessarily be shared by the community upon whom it is
being imposed. Unless one believes that there is a broad social con-
sensus or underlying principle on which value should be promoted,
and views the judiciary as a representative lawmaking body, 158 the
judicial imposition of the goals underlying non-behavioral strict liabil-
ity raises serious legitimacy concerns.
Since the utilization of a traditional negligence approach vests
the lawmaking function in the jury, it does not raise the same legiti-
macy concerns.15 9 However, the traditional negligence approach does
not serve majoritarian rule as well as the model developed here since
the traditional approach judges individuals by the norms of their own
group without recognizing that this should not be the case when an
individual has engaged in disenfranchising conduct-that is, conduct
that either interferes with one's ability to enter the political process to
effect change or that hides the necessity to do so. 160
V. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE: PRODUCT DEFECTS UNDER THE
SECOND AND THIRD RESTATEMENTS OF TORTS
Having sketched the outlines of a model of tort decisionmaking
and provided a brief glimpse of its descriptive value and normative
underpinnings, I will now demonstrate how this model can be applied
to some of the more difficult product liability issues presently con-
fronting us. Specifically, I will use this model as the basis of com-
menting on the approaches taken by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 402A and the proposed revisions of section 402A
157. For a description of much recent tort scholarship as the expression of personal value
statements, see White, Tort Law in America at 213 (cited in note 13).
158. This is apparently the view taken by Professor Shapo. See note 43.
159. Amar, 100 Yale L. J. at 1183-99 (cited in note 44) (explaining jury decisionmaking as a
form of direct participatory democracy).
160. See text accompanying notes 85-89.
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contained in the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability.
Perhaps because so many judicial decisions purported to adopt
section 402A,' 61 the approach of the Third Restatement's drafters has
drawn both criticism and support from many of the most highly
respected commentators on product liability issues. 62 The model set
forth in this Article offers a new framework for considering both
section 402A and the proposed revisions.
A. The Basics
Section 402A purports to set forth a rule of strict liability in
tort that applies to commercial product sellers. Before the seller will
be held strictly liable, however, the injury-causing product must be
found to have been "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property... ,"163
Section 402A defines "defective condition" as "a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him."'164 The definition of "unreasonably dangerous" is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics."165
The proposed revisions in the Third Restatement would dis-
count the importance of consumer expectations in making the all-
important determination of product "defectiveness."166 Instead, fol-
161. See Robert D. Hursh and Henry J. Bailey, 1 American Law of Products Liability § 4:41
(Lawyers Cooperative, 2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1985) (containing a state-by-state analysis of
decisions regarding the adoption of strict liability for defective products). Of course, the actual
test of "defect," particularly in design cases, varies significantly from state to state.
162. See, for example, A Symposium on the ALI's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1043 (1994); Symposium, The Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Occasion for Reform of Product Liability Law?, 10 Touro L.
Rev. 1 (1993); Special Issue: Review of the System of Products Liability Law, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev.
227; Shapo, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 631 (cited in note 1); Howard A. Latin, Memorandum to ALI
Council and Members, Behavioral Criticisms of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability (June 6, 1994) (on file with the Author).
163. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
164. Id. cmt. g.
165. Id. cmt. i.
166. The Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
provides:
Subsection (b) states that a product is defective in design if the omission of a reasonable
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe. A broad range of factors
may legitimately be considered in determining whether an alternative design is reason-
able and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably safe. The factors
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lowing the doctrinal distinctions established by courts subsequent to
the promulgation of section 402A,167 the drafters have broken "product
defect" into three types: manufacturing, design, and failure to warn
or to provide instructions for safe usage. 168
"Manufacturing defects," except in the case of food products,
are defined by utilization of a "deviation from the norm" test-that is,
the "product contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
parts from its intended design even though all possible care was exer-
cised in the preparation and marketing of the product."169 In food
cases, however, the drafters have proposed that the consumer expec-
tation test be retained to determine "defectiveness."' 170
The Third Restatement "failure to warn" defects are defined by
what appears to be a straight-forward negligence test. A product will
be "defective" by reason of a lack or inadequacy of warnings or
instructions for safe usage "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of
reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distribu-
tor.., and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
product not reasonably safe."171
Under the new proposal, the existence of a "design defect" is
established by comparing the design which is alleged to have caused
the harm to a "reasonable alternative design." The comparison that
include.., the magnitude of the foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions and
warnings accompanying the product, and the nature and strength of consumer
expectations regarding the product. The relative advantages and disadvantages of the
product as designed and as it alternatively could have been designed may also be
considered. Thus, the likely effects of the alternative design on production
costs; ... product longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics; and the range of con-
sumer choice among products are factors that may be taken into account.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft) (emphasis
added).
167. Id. "Reporter's Note" to § 1 cmt. a ("Abundant authority recognizes the division of
product defects into manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects based on inadequate
instructions or warnings.") The extensive list of authorities is omitted here. Priest argues:
[Tihe founders did not fully appreciate the distinctions among manufacturing defects,
design defects, and defective warnings that would become the centerpiece of modern
law. Section 402A represented only a limited change in the law because the founders
intended the Section's strict liability standard, with minor exceptions, to apply only to
what we now call manufacturing defect cases. Section 402A and its Comments were
drafted with little more than manufacturing defect cases in mind. There was
unanimous agreement among the founders that design defect cases were to be controlled
by traditional negligence law and that warning and instruction cases were to be
controlled by a negligence approach.
Priest, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2303 (cited in note 110).
168. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (Proposed Final Draft).
169. Id. § 2(a).
170. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
171. Id. § 2(c).
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the drafters contemplate is to be done by means of a fairly conven-
tional risk-utility analysis, with consumer expectation considered as
one of the factors. 172
2. Comments on Evaluating a Restatement
Before attempting to compare and evaluate the two schemes of
products liability, it is first necessary to set forth briefly the nature of
the ALI's "Restatement" projects. As Professor Shapo has explained:
At its most reductionist, it involves counting the decisions and selecting the
majority rule, at least where there are enough decisions on a particular issue
to justify calling the rule a "majority" position.
But those who have wrangled over the contents of Restatements for more
than half a century would not be satisfied with this answer. They would say
that, since the purpose of Restatements is to improve the law, restaters should
seek wisdom and excellence in their choice of legal rules.173
However, in addition to "restating the law," or restating the
law with an eye toward the incremental improvement of the law,
Professor Shapo identifies a third approach toward the drafting of a
restatement: "[This] approach assumes that a Restatement should be
candidly responsive to competing political interests. Like a legislative
body although without its socially conferred power-[the restaters]
ultimately should seek a resolution that is politically viable, so long as
it is not constitutionally irrational."174
The literal understanding of "Restatements" as restating the
existing law makes it impossible, or at least inappropriate, to level
criticism against Restatements in the same way that one might criti-
cize a journal article or other scholarly work. While under other
circumstances internal inconsistency between an instrumentalist
approach and an assessment of conduct approach might well be a
valid basis for criticism, here it is not. Inasmuch as there is enormous
inconsistency in the existing case law, it is almost inevitable that
some would be reflected in the Restatements of the Law.
172. Id. § 2 cmt. e.
173. Shapo, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 634 (cited in note 1).
174. Id. at 635. Though it presents an extremely important issue, this Article will not deal
with the entire question of the Restatement as "quasi-legislation" offered for adoption by judges
for subsequent imposition on the community. While I have briefly pointed out the basis of my
view that a commitment to majoritarian rule demands a jury's assessment of conduct rather
than a judge's imposition of his or her own views or interpretation of community views, a full
discussion and defense of that position is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that there is considerable internal
inconsistency in the Second Restatement and even more within the
proposed Third Restatement.
Additionally, and more importantly, I believe that the failure
to recognize explicitly the group selection issue set forth here consti-
tutes a serious shortcoming in the Second Restatement. This short-
coming has been perpetuated and exacerbated by the approach taken
by the drafters of the Third Restatement.
1. The Nature of Liability Established by the Restatements
a. Section 402A
It is difficult to say with any confidence how much the drafters
of section 402A intended to base liability on conduct and to what
extent they contemplated reducing a purely non-behavioral enterprise
liability approach to tort law to Restatement blackletter.175
Explaining the theoretical basis of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A, comment c states in part:
[T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by
marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed
a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may
be injured by it: that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for con-
sumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of
production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the con-
sumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands
of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the prod-
ucts.
176
The drafters' approach seems to combine instrumentalist notions of
efficient cost allocation with a traditional fairness justification for
strict liability without entirely resting upon or being consistent with
either.177  A non-behavioral, cost-allocation justification for strict
175. See Priest, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2307 (cited in note 110) ("[Central figures in the
Restatement process occasionally alluded to risk distribution as grounds for extending liability,
but the arguments were most often simply additional points and seldom at the heart of the
analysis." (footnotes omitted)).
176. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c.
177. See Wertheimer, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1184-87 (cited in note 140) ("[A]s between the
innocent plaintiff and the innocent manufacturer, the choice to place liability on the manufac-
turer is not dictated by economic theory alone.").
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liability asks who is in the best position initially to absorb the
accident cost without major economic dislocation and subsequently
spread that cost.178 Enterprise liability is not necessarily linked to the
defendant's conduct. While most theorists agree that liability may be
imposed on the party who caused the accident (as distinct from some
wholly uninvolved third person), the justification for this approach is
not linked to any notion of just deserts or even fairness. 179 Requiring
a causal link serves to identify the party who should internalize the
cost in order to induce that party to engage in some desirable conduct
in the future-to invest in research and development, for example.1 80
The imposition of liability is thus forward-looking and divorced from
the behavior that caused the harm at issue.
The proposition that the drafters intended an instrumentalist
approach finds support in some of the blackletter provisions of section
402A.181 If such an approach was intended, it makes complete sense
to provide for liability even though "the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,"18 2 and also to
provide that only those in the "business of selling"83 should face strict
178. See Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale U.,
1970).
179. As Professor Kiemme has asserted:
This requirement of "but for" cause cannot be explained on the ground that it is
essential to having a tort judgment provide a deterrent effect on the defendanes future
conduct. On the contrary, exactly the opposite seems true. A more valid explanation of
the rule lies in the theory of enterprise liability and its rationale of using the market
place as a tool for "bese' allocating the community's limited resources.
Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153, 163
(1976). Professor Klemme continues:
[Tihe general statement of the theory of enterprise liability does not tell us from among
all the infinite "but for" causes which may have brought about the plaintiffs loss which
particular "but for" activity or enterprise the loss should be assigned to, it does tell us
we ought not assign it to an activity which had no "but for" causal relationship with that
particular loss at all.
Id. at 165.
180. The drafters of the Third Restatement have stated:
On the premise that tort law serves the instrumental function of creating safety
initiatives, imposing strict liability on manufacturers for harm caused by manufacturing
defects is thought to encourage greater investment in product safety than does a regime
of fault-based liability under which, as a practical matter, sellers may escape their
appropriate share of responsibility.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft).
181. But see Priest, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2317-24 (cited in note 110) (analyzing the
blackletter and finding little support for the proposition that section 402A was intended to
establish an instrumentalist system of loss allocation).
182. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a).
183. See id. § 402A cmt. f.
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liability, as such parties are in a position to internalize the cost thus
incurred.
That an enterprise liability approach was intended finds addi-
tional support in the "substantial change" provision.184 One of the
most difficult issues for the enterprise liability theorist has always
been to determine which of several enterprises should be required to
internalize a particular accident's cost.185 Section 402A's provision
that a post-sale "substantial change in the condition" of the product
will immunize the original seller from liability can be seen as a way of
determining that an enterprise other than the original seller should
have to internalize the cost. Additionally, as to non-manufacturing
and non-designing sellers-those in the chain of distribution who
merely act as conduits-there appears to be no plausible claim that
section 402A establishes anything other than a cost-allocation mecha-
nism.
At its core, however, section 402A does not seem to be
consistent with the establishment of a pure instrumentalist cost-
allocation system. If one were truly committed to accomplishing this
aim, the prerequisite for liability that the product be "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" would be
counterproductive. After all, the goal of such a system is presumably
the internalization of all costs generated by the product. 86 At least in
the design and warning cases, requiring that the product be defective
introduces the question of the degree of danger inherent in design
choices and thus, in effect, requires the creation of a certain level of
risk before liability is imposed. The result of the drafters' approach is
that only some of the accident costs associated with products will be
internalized.
At the same time, section 402A is not entirely consistent with
a Fletcher v. Rylands and Horrocks187 notion of strict liability either.
The original Rylands idea is that one acts at one's own peril. That is,
as between two innocent parties, the loss should be borne by the one
who, for his own benefit, exposed another to a risk of harm.188 Again,
184. Section 402A provides for liability "if... [the product] is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold." Id. §
402A(1)(b).
185. See, for example, Kiemme, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 164-65 (cited in note 179).
186. See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 Ohio St. L. J. 443, 459
(1987) (making the point that if internalization of accident costs is intended to influence the
behavior of economically rational actors, both tortfeasors and consumers, more liability claims
will further deterrence and informational goals).
187. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Exch. (1866), affd, 3 L.R.-E.&I. App. 330 (1868).
188. 4 H. & C. at 271 (Blackburn, J.)
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however, the blackletter requirement that the product be "in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer"
introduces a threshold level of risk that must have been created
before liability is imposed. One can thus create some lower level of
risk for one's own benefit without having to compensate persons who
are injured as a consequence. 8 9
Assuming one does not choose to interpret section 402A as
seeking only to assess the condition of the product rather than the
conduct that created it-an interpretation that has been rejected by
the courts'9°-the fact that section 402A requires the creation of a
high level of risk as a prerequisite for the imposition of liability while
also expressly asserting the irrelevance of the level of care exercised
by the seller does not necessarily make the section incoherent.
With regard to those actively involved in the design or manu-
facture of the product, the "defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous" language converts section 402A from an instrumentalist, non-
behavioral strict liability provision to one which requires an assess-
ment of conduct. Fault, in the traditional sense of comparing a manu-
facturer's conduct with that of the "reasonable manufacturer" is not
required. In fact, section 402A(2)(a) expressly precludes such
analysis.' 9' However, fault in the sense that the defendant's conduct
is adjudged unacceptable from another's perspective is still required.
In effect then, section 402A creates behavioral strict liability.
In this context, it is critically important to recognize that the
comments to section 402A identify the perspective to be utilized in
assessing behavior. The product is defective if it is "in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him."192 Thus, at its core, section 402A represents a
system of behavioral strict liability with a "default" rule that is the
exact reverse of that chosen in this Article.
189. One possible explanation has been offered by Professor Fletcher. He argues that it is
the non-reciprocal risk creation which triggers liability rather than "jusf" risk creation. See
Fletcher, 85 Harv. L. Rev. at 542 (cited in note 7). But see Jules L. Coleman, Justice and
Reciprocity in Tort Theory, 14 W. Ontario L. Rev. 105 (1975) (criticizing Professor Fletcher's
analysis).
190. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
191. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2) provides: 'The rule stated in Subsection
(1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product... "
192. Id. § 402A cmt. g.
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b. The Third Restatement
Regardless of whether a lack of internal consistency consti-
tutes a valid basis for criticizing the Third Restatement, the conclu-
sion that such inconsistency exists is inescapable. Some of the pro-
posed revisions represent unabashedly instrumentalist, non-behav-
ioral strict liability. Other provisions are based on a traditional neg-
ligence approach. Still others contemplate behavioral strict liability
and seek to have a defendant's conduct judged by the standards of a
group to which he, she, or it does not belong.
Consider, for example, the drafters' decision to leave section
402A unchanged to the extent that it holds non-manufacturing sellers
of products (retailers and wholesalers) liable for injuries caused by a
product defect even though the product was "defective" for reasons
having nothing to do with any act or omission on their part. In
comment a to section 2 the drafters explain:
An often-cited rationale for holding wholesalers and retailers strictly liable for
harm caused by manufacturing defects is that, as between them and innocent
victims who suffer harm because of defective products, the product sellers as
business entities are in a better position than are individual users and con-
sumers to insure against such losses. In most instances, wholesalers and re-
tailers will be able to pass liability costs up the chain of product distribution to
the manufacturer.... Finally, holding retailers and wholesalers strictly liable
creates incentives for them to deal only with reputable, financially responsible
manufacturers and distributors, thereby helping to protect the interests of us-
ers and consumers. 193
Thus, an instrumentalist rationale underlies the drafters' ap-
proach to a middleman seller's liability. Yet the ability to "insure"
(whether contractually or through common law indemnity claims) and
the creation of various behavior incentives are rejected as the basis
for imposing liability on manufacturers for harm caused by products
that presented risks unforeseeable at the time of manufacture.
Section 2, comment a states, in part:
For the liability system to be fair and efficient, most courts agree that the bal-
ancing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must be
done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reason-
ably attainable at the time of distribution. To hold a manufacturer liable for a
risk that was not foreseeable when the product was marketed might foster in-
creased manufacturer investment in safety. But such investment by definition
would be a matter of guesswork. To insure against future claims, the manu-
facturer would be required to estimate the risks upon which claims would be
193. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft).
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based. A commercial insurer would be in no better position to make such an
estimate. Thus, with respect to unforeseeable or incalculable risks, manufac-
turers would find it inherently impossible adequately to protect themselves
with insurance. Furthermore, manufacturers may persuasively ask to be
judged by a normative behavior standard to which it is reasonably possible for
manufacturers to conform. For these reasons, Subsections (b) and (c) speak of
products being defective only when risks were reasonably foreseeable.
194
Thus, non-behavioral strict liability is contemplated for non-
manufacturing sellers, while traditional negligence governs manufac-
turers. Recognizing a manufacturer's normative claim to be judged by
a behavioral standard to which it can conform, while refusing to
recognize the retailer's identical claim seems logically indefensible.
This approach strikes a poor compromise between moving the law in
the right direction and restating existing doctrine.
The inconsistency in theoretical underpinnings is also evident
in the explanation for the imposition of liability in the manufacturing
defect cases. The drafters offer several justifications for imposing
liability when injury is caused by a product that fails to conform to
the manufacturer's own design specifications. The "instrumental
functions" of spurring "greater investment in product safety," discour-
aging "the consumption of defective products by causing the purchase
price of products to reflect.., the costs of defects," and the reduction
of "transaction costs involved in litigating that issue" are all duly
noted.195
In justifying the imposition of strict liability for manufacturing
defects, however, the drafters also seem to view product defectiveness
as proof of a manufacturer's misconduct. Thus, they assert:
In many cases manufacturing defects are in fact caused by manufacturer neg-
ligence but plaintiffs will have difficulty proving it. Strict liability therefore
performs a function similar to the concept of res ipsa loquitur, allowing deserv-
ing plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would otherwise be difficult or
insuperable problems of proof.196
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The idea that "strict liability" eases the proof problems that otherwise might exist
in negligence cases can be traced back to Dean Prosser and was later repeated by Dean Keeton.
See William E. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
L. J. 1099, 1114 (1960); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's
Negligence, 49 Va. L. Rev. 675 (1963). See also Priest, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. at 2309-10 (cited in
note 110) (discussing Prosser and Keeton).
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Not only are instrumentalist non-behavioral strict liability and
traditional negligence justifications presented, but behavioral strict
liability also makes an appearance. In manufacturing defect cases
that involve inedible matter in food products, the drafters, following
the majority of courts that have considered the issue,' 97 recommend
the use of a consumer expectation test. They argue:
A consumer expectation test in this context relies upon culturally defined,
widely shared standards that food products ought to meet. Although consumer
expectations are not adequate to supply a standard for defect in other contexts,
assessments of what consumers have the right to expect in various commercial
food preparations are sufficiently well-formed that judges and triers of fact can
sensibly resolve whether liability should be imposed using this standard. 198
In short then, the proposed Third Restatement sets forth the
justifications not only for traditional negligence, but for behavioral
and non-behavioral strict liability as well. While this undoubtedly is
a fair reflection of the currently chaotic state of American product
liability law, it has little to recommend it as a map for future direc-
tion.
2. The Group Selection Omission
a. Section 402A
As previously noted, the drafters of the Second Restatement,
section 402A utilized a "consumer expectation" test to define both
"defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer."'9 9 The effect of this approach is to reverse the default rule
proposed by this Article.200 In other words, 402A reverses the tradi-
tional negligence approach, the application of which would assess
manufacturers' conduct from a reasonable manufacturer's perspec-
tive. Instead, it mandates the use of a consumer's perspective as its
default rule.
The primary exception to this approach is contained in com-
ment k.201 In the case of "unavoidably unsafe products," rather than
197. See note 106 and accompanying text.
198. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft).
199. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmts. g and i.
200. See text accompanying note 109.
201. Comment k provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. Such a product,
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assess the extent of danger from the consumer's perspective, comment
k contemplates the utilization of a risk-utility test. The result is that,
if the product is accompanied by an adequate warning, the assess-
ment of danger in view of the accompanying benefits is assessed from
the manufacturer's perspective.
20 2
In the case of the Pasteur vaccine for rabies, to use the draft-
ers' own example, even though administration of the drug may itself
have serious repercussions for the patient, the consumer's expectation
is irrelevant to the liability issue. The alternative to receiving the
drug is a horrible death and, therefore, the utility of marketing the
product clearly outweighs the risk. 03
The problem with the Second Restatement's choice of con-
sumer perception as a default rule, however, is that it violates the
basic fairness notion which underlies the traditional negligence group
selection decision 20 4 without offering the majoritarian rule-enforcing
justification discussed here,20 5 or any other justification for departing
from a traditional negligence approach. As explained earlier, the
particular inter-group or inter-personal dealings between the parties
may provide a good reason for judging one person's behavior from
another's perspective. 206 In the absence of one of those reasons, how-
ever, such a shift in the default rule seems indefensible.20 7
While comment k recognizes one situation in which a consumer
perspective approach should not be utilized, section 402A does not
contain enough similar exceptions that permit deviation from the
reverse default rule adopted by the drafters. As previously discussed,
judging a manufacturer's conduct from the perspective of the con-
sumer will not be appropriate in many, and perhaps most, cases.20 8
In fact, the criticisms of the "consumer expectation" test of
product defect frequently point to situations in which it is inappropri-
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous.... The seller of such products... is not to be held to
strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. k.
202. See notes 108-10 and accompanying text. As before, I assume here that "risk-utility"
represents a "manufacturer standard" of behavior.
203. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. k.
204. See text accompanying notes 79-82. See also text accompanying note 192.
205. See text accompanying notes 87-89.
206. See text accompanying notes 91-107.
207. Unless it was intended to create non-behavioral strict liability, of course.
208. See text accompanying notes 64-73.
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ate or even impossible to move away from a traditional negligence
test.209 Consider, for example, the possibility that the nature of the
defendant's business is such that consumers really have no expecta-
tions regarding manufacturers' conduct. Under these circumstances,
in which the group selection decision is between two groups only one
of which has expectations, the court must necessarily choose the
group with expectations.2' 0
By rigidly fixing the perspective that is to be utilized through
definition, section 402A denies the courts that adopt it the flexibility
necessary to resolve many cases satisfactorily. More importantly,
assuming that section 402A was not intended exclusively to represent
an instrumental cost-allocation approach (the insistence on the
existence of a product "defect" seems to support this assumption),
there is no satisfactory justification offered for judging manufacturers'
conduct from a consumer's viewpoint.2"
b. The Third Restatement
While section 402A resolved the group selection issue in favor
of the consumer group as a matter of definition,2' 2 the Third
Restatement generally proposes resolving it in favor of the
manufacturer group, at least in design and warning cases. 2' 3
In the design defect cases, although "consumer expectation" is
made part of the general risk-utility calculus used to determine the
existence of defect,2' 14 it is presumably to be considered to the extent
that a reasonable manufacturer (judged from a manufacturer's per-
spective) would take a consumer's expectations into account. In other
words, incorporating "consumer expectation" into the test for defect
209. See Montgomery and Owen, 27 S.C. L. Rev. at 803 (cited in note 64).
210. See text accompanying notes 64-69. The consumer expectation test is also frequently
criticized as being inappropriate where the defect is obvious and in cases where a bystander is
harmed. See, for example, Montgomery and Owen, 27 S.C. L. Rev. at 823 (cited in note 64).
However, if a manufacturer's conduct in creating the product is being assessed, these objections
to a consumer-oriented approach disappear.
211. While it is true that section 402A is partly based on Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), and also true that Greenman raises the
issue of manufacturer misrepresentation, misrepresentation is not expressly utilized in section
402A as a justification for rejecting negligence. In fact, no basis is satisfactorily articulated.
212. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmts. g and i.
213. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1, cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft)
C'The concept of strict liability, which focuses on the product rather than the conduct of the
manufacturer, may help make the point that a defendant is held to the expert standard of
knowledge available to the relevant manufacturing community at the time the product was
manufactured.") (emphasis added)).
214. Id. § 2 cmt. f.
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does not alter its fundamental reliance on the manufacturer's per-
spective. 215
Section 2(b) provides that "a product is defective in design
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller... and the omission of the alternative design ren-
ders the product not reasonably safe."2' 6 Other than by the assertion
that the "defendant is held to the expert standard of knowledge
available to the relevant manufacturing community at the time the
product was manufactured,"217 the draft does not explicitly address
the "according to whom" question. Nevertheless, the choice of the
manufacturer's perspective is evidenced by the fact that the primary
justification for the rule is the manufacturer's right, in fairness, "to be
judged by a normative behavior standard to which it is reasonably
possible for manufacturers to conform." 218 However, just as section
402A's consumer group selection was not always justifiable, the Third
Restatement's manufacturer group selection will not always be defen-
sible.
Consider, for example, a variation of a hypothetical posed at
the ALI meeting in May of 1994. Suppose that a drug manufacturer
developed a product that cured the common cold but caused
substantial harm to a small but significant percentage of those who
used it.219 Given the enormous aggregate costs of the common cold,
the marketing of such a product might be justifiable from an industry
standpoint if the associated incidence of harm was not excessively
high. From a consumer's perspective, however, the marketing of that
product might well be judged unacceptable. 220
215. Except that, as previously noted, a true consumer perspective approach is taken in the
impure food cases. See note 170 and notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
216. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) (Proposed Final Draft).
217. Id. § 1 cmt. a.
218. Id. § 2 cmt. a.
219. Proceedings of the American Law Institute, 71st Annual Meeting 113 (1994)
(comments of Professor William S. Crowe, Sr.). Professor Crowe's hypothetical actually sought
to point out problems in requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design. To this end it
posited blindness in 10% of the consumers.
220. Actually, the problem with the Third Restatement's treatment of design defects is
even greater than indicated. Not only has group selection been rigidly determined, but the
content of that standard is fixed. Section 2(b) makes the question of whether or not a manufac-
turer has conformed with the standard turn on the existence of a "reasonable alternative
design." In the absence of such an alternative, the product is not defective no matter how
dangerous or how the decision to market such a dangerous product would be otherwise judged.
There is only a limited exception to this "reasonable alternative" requirement. In May of
1994, on motion of Robert L. Habush, the ALI voted to adopt language which acknowledges that
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Along the same lines, consider Turner v. General Motors
Corp.,221 a case stemming from injuries sustained in an automobile
roll-over accident. The automobile involved in the accident was a
sedan with an essentially cosmetic roof that afforded little protection
when the vehicle rolled. While such a design choice might be
defensible from a manufacturer's perspective, it probably is not from a
consumer's perspective. 2 2
The failure to consider the group selection process is also a
significant problem in the Third Restatement's treatment of "failure
to warn" defects. While section 2(c) provides that "a product is
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller," the "reasonable according to whom" issue is
not addressed except to the extent that it is asserted that the
reasonableness test parallels subsection (b).223 Section 2(b), in effect,
adopts a reasonable manufacturer standard for judging the safety of
product designs. Thus, presumably, a seller's perspective standard is
intended in the warning cases as well. However, this should not
always be the case.
The problem presented in Murray v. Wilson Oak looring Co.224
provides a useful illustration. In that case, vapors from a floor
adhesive were "capable (1) of traveling for some distance along a floor
from the point at which the mastic is spread, (2) of burning with ex-
plosive force on encountering any form of exposed flame, and (3) of
transmitting that flame back to the body of spread adhesive."25 The
warning on the can specifically stated, "extinguish flame-including
pilot lights" and, in larger letters, "DO NOT USE NEAR FIRE OR
FLAME."226 In the course of reversing a judgment n.o.v. and
reinstating the verdict for the plaintiff, the court reasoned, "We
the design of some products is so "manifestly unreasonable" that liability may be imposed even
in the absence of an alternative.
Illustration 5 to section 2 provides the example of an exploding cigar which causes serious
injury. Presumably, the utility of a cure for the common cold would be high enough, however, to
take it out of this limited exception.
221. 514 S.W.2d 497 ('ex. Civ. App. 1974).
222. Id. at 500 (citing testimony "based upon ... forty-five years of sales experience, [that]
the average consumer believes that a sedan vehicle will be a reasonably safe product in a roll-
over").
223. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. h (Proposed Final Draft).
See also id. at § 1 cmt. a.
224. 475 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1973).
225. Id. at 132.
226. Id. at 130.
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cannot say as a matter of law that the term 'near' was sufficient to
inform Murray that his spreading of adhesive within four feet of a
pilot light located behind a closed door and within eight feet of stove
pilot lights three feet off the floor exposed him to the risk of an
explosion and attendant fire damage."21
The adequacy of the warning-or more accurately the per-
ceived culpability of the manufacturer's conduct in choosing what
warning to give-may well turn on the group selection issue. To peo-
ple with somewhat specialized knowledge about the dangers involved
in using the product and which safety precautions "obviously" must be
taken, the manufacturer's conduct in providing the particular
warning would undoubtedly seem reasonable. However, from the
perspective of the do-it-yourselfer, reasonableness is a closer question
and, as the court recognized, one appropriately left to the jury. In
these types of cases, the jury should be expressly instructed as to
whose perspective on reasonableness is to be utilized, depending on
the group selection decision.
In short then, the Third Restatement has not corrected the
flaw in the Second Restatement, but simply reversed it. The Second
Restatement failed to recognize the common need to depart from
utilization of the consumer's perspective and the Third Restatement,
by selecting the reasonable manufacturer or seller standard based on
the intuitive fairness considerations underlying the default rule
developed here, fails to consider the need for exceptions and the
underlying justification for those exceptions.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has long been assumed that tort law can be viewed largely
as a choice between negligence and strict liability. In this Article, I
have tried to demonstrate the descriptive and analytical shortcomings
of this way of thinking about tort doctrine.
There are, in fact, at least three different bases for the imposi-
tion of liability that cut across the common negligence and strict li-
ability classification scheme. First, a party's conduct can be assessed
by comparing it to the norms of behavior developed by the group or
227. Id. at 132-33. A variation on the recurring pilot light theme of Murray is used by the
drafters of the Third Restatement. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2
illustration 10 (Proposed Final Draft).
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subgroup in which he or she is a member. While traditionally this
has been the "negligence" approach, some cases commonly labeled as
"negligence" cases do not fit within such a framework.
For example, cases involving the liability of children who have
engaged in "adult" activities such as driving represent a different
liability rule-one in which a party's behavior is assessed by
comparing it to the norms of behavior developed by a group to which
the party does not belong. I have termed this second form of liability
"behavioral strict liability." While it involves the assessment of a
party's behavior, it does not require "fault" in the conventional sense.
Within the areas of tort law that are commonly labeled "strict
liability" cases one finds both "behavioral strict liability" and a third
form which I have called "non-behavioral strict liability." Non-behav-
ioral strict liability seeks to impose liability on a party as part of an
instrumental cost-allocation process. While the goals of such a proc-
ess may be to influence the future behavior of individuals-by increas-
ing investment in research for example-non-behavioral strict liabil-
ity is distinct from behavioral strict liability. Non-behavioral strict
liability does not seek to impose tort liability based on a
determination that a party's injury-causing conduct fails to meet some
group's standard.
To a large extent, this Article has focused on one major conse-
quence of the failure to recognize the existence of these separate and
distinct forms of liability. Although instrumentalism held sway
within the legal community for a time,228 its later rejection by courts
and commentators seems to have led many people to the erroneous
conclusion that the only alternative to such non-behavioral strict
liability is traditional negligence doctrine. This, however, is not the
case. Behavioral strict liability has not only survived the death of
instrumentalist tort liability, but is also evident throughout existing
legal doctrine, even though it is not named or otherwise identified as
such.
If I am correct in claiming that the real choice now is between
traditional negligence and behavioral strict liability, we must seek to
identify a principled basis for choosing whether one's conduct will be
228. See George P. Fletcher, Why Kant, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 421, 421-22 (1987) CFrom the
second world war to Kennedy's assassination and for several years thereafter, a consensus
prevailed in law schools about the policies that should guide the law's development. The reign-
ing policies were these: (1) in tort law: cost spreading, compensation of victims and discour-
agement of excessive risk taking; (2) in contracts: facilitation of economically productive ex-
changes.... The pursuit of these policies in the least costly way defines a utilitarian approach
to legal decision making.").
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assessed from the perspective of one's own group or that of another.
As things presently stand, the choice is frequently made tacitly, solely
on the basis of intuition, or inappropriately made in furtherance of
non-behavioral strict liability goals.
In this Article, I have tried to sketch briefly the underpinnings
for my belief that our commitment to majority rule provides the basis
for making the all-important group selection decision in a principled
fashion. While there may be enormous disagreement as to what goals
our society should pursue at any given time, I believe there is an
overwhelming consensus that some version of majoritarian politics is
the process by which those goals-whatever they may be-should be
chosen. If this is correct, then it follows that the group selection
process must be consistent with and in furtherance of majority rule
within a pluralistic society. Since a lack of openness and honesty in
dealings between groups directly affects the ability of group members
to enter the political process to alter an unsatisfactory status quo
legitimately, a ban on misrepresentation and an insistence on full dis-
closure emerge as the obvious bases for making the group selection
decision.
I do not pretend that this Article adequately explains any par-
ticular version of majoritarian theory or defends its importance in the
decision of common law cases. Obviously, one cannot do so without
confronting the larger questions of the roles of the judiciary and jury
as lawmaking institutions and the extent to which direct participa-
tory democracy remains a part of our system. Rather, as the title
indicates, this Article is intended only as an overview of issues which
require and deserve far more extensive consideration.
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